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Editor’s Note 
 
 
This Spring 2018 edition of the James Blair Historical Review 
marks a milestone in our publication’s history—never before has our 
journal released two issues in one academic school year. The sheer level 
of work to produce just one issue has typically required two semesters of 
investment. However, with a great deal of effort on behalf of our editing 
team and peer reviewers, we managed to push our boundaries and 
produce not one, but two compilations of exemplary undergraduate 
historical research for the Fall 2017-Spring 2018 academic year. Given 
that additional issues grant students more opportunities to share their 
stellar work with the rest of the world, we hope that publishing bi-
annually will become an ongoing practice for our journal.  
But besides starting this new convention, we also revived an 
earlier tradition—publishing an issue in print. The last time our journal 
existed in a physical form was 2014. I believe that history is best 
consumed from old-fashioned ink on paper, so I am happy to announce 
that physical copies of the Spring 2018 issue of the James Blair 
Historical Review will be available in early Fall 2018 for students and 
faculty of the College of William & Mary, as well as visitors. 
Of course, none of these achievements would have been possible 
without tremendous support from many people. I would like to thank my 
fellow editors for suggesting article revisions to authors and formatting 
this issue, and our peer reviewers for highlighting the articles most fitting 
for publication. I would also like to thank our faculty advisor, Dr. Stump, 
for overseeing our journal’s progress this past year. Lastly, I would like 
to extend my greatest appreciation for every author who submitted 
articles to our journal. Our publication would not exist without their 
assistance, and we wish we could publish all of the amazing papers that 
we receive. Alas, only four could make the cut for this issue, but I am 
incredibly pleased with the results—and I hope you, the reader, will 
share the same sentiment. Thank you for engaging with our Spring 2018 
issue, and please enjoy the subsequent 70+ pages of excellent historical 
research.  
 
Sincerely, 
Barrett Mills 
Editor-in-Chief  
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Stirring Appeals: Elite Southern Women, 
Confederate Fasts, and Christian Unity 
 
Daniel Burns 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Amidst the turmoil of the American Civil War, Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis established national days of fasting to 
instill within the South what he considered ethical, religious ideals. 
During those fasts, Davis intended for Southerners to pray to the 
Christian God and abstain from eating and drinking to reinforce a 
Confederate sense of religious purpose and identity. But what of 
those social groups, such as elite Southern women, that had no say 
in the creation of these fasting days?1 How did those fasts affect 
them and their desires for Christian unity throughout the South? 
Regardless of where they lived and their denominations, elite 
Southern women’s religiosity combined with their support for Davis 
to inspire their attendance of fast-day religious sermons throughout 
the conflict.2   
In the war’s first year, fast-day sermons’ espousals of 
Confederate righteousness calmed elite women’s early-war 
anxieties and rendered them disinclined to emphasize collective 
fast-day adherence. However, after years of hardships and military 
defeats, women could no longer merely accept that God favored the 
South—though their religiosity sustained their attendance at fasting 
services. The sermons that ministers delivered during national fasts 
in the second half of the war explained Confederate failures as God’s 
punishment for Southerners’ sins, and thus helped convince elite 
women that collective Southern adherence to fasting days would 
help appease their god. After 1862, Southern women stopped 
writing of how fasting services alleviated their fears; instead, they 
7
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desired collective Southern compliance with national fasts to ensure 
future Confederate success.3 
The argument that elite women appealed for collective 
Southern fasting in the war’s second half adds two dimensions to 
contemporary Civil War historiography. First, current scholarship 
on transformations in Southern women’s wartime relationships with 
Confederate officials often overlooks elite women. Stephanie 
McCurry’s Confederate Reckoning argues that Southern “women 
citizens’ relationship with the state dates from the Civil War…. 
With the war, the necessity and frequency of citizens’ 
communications with state governors increased exponentially and a 
growing portion came from women.”4 McCurry limits her argument 
mainly to non-elite women. Yet by 1863, elite women occasionally 
reprimanded soldiers and officers who did not meet their standards 
of fast-day adherence. As the war progressed, they unintentionally 
mimicked their non-elite counterparts by increasingly defying 
antebellum notions of proper gender relations. By the war’s second 
half, both the non-elite women about whom McCurry writes and the 
elite women in this essay considered it necessary to address male 
officials with their wartime concerns.   
Second, historians who have covered religion in the 
American Civil War have neglected to discuss how women reacted 
to Confederate fasts. Scholarship on Confederate fasting days 
focuses mainly on how CSA officials and Southern ministers 
interpreted the importance of those national events. An example of 
this sort of examination includes historian James Farmer’s The 
Metaphysical Confederacy, which discusses certain characteristics 
common to many early-war fasting sermons.5 Yet an analysis of 
how elite women regarded Confederate fasts reveals how wider 
portions of the Southern population—those whose gender restrained 
them from establishing national fasting days or preaching during 
them—understood the relationship between government and 
religion. Such an analysis clarifies how the South’s wealthiest group 
of disenfranchised civilians connected their prewar religious 
convictions to their support for the Confederacy through their near-
unanimous defense of the national fasts that their government 
established. Perhaps most importantly, an examination of Southern 
8
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women’s interpretations of Confederate fasts takes another step 
towards explaining how the entire Southern populace engaged with 
and understood the purpose of national fasting days. It provides a 
perspective on the topic that complements other historians’ research 
on how Southern sources of secular and religious authority 
interpreted Confederate fasts. 
 
Factors Influencing Fasting  
 
Two factors primarily influenced elite Southern women’s 
support for fasting days throughout the war. First, antebellum 
religious developments predisposed elite women to engage in 
national fasts. Although men filled ministerial positions throughout 
the South, women also played roles in prewar religious functions 
and societies. As historian Jon Butler explains, antebellum white 
women “frequently found opportunities to exercise spiritual 
leadership in the interstices of male-dominated Protestant 
denominations” and “worked in their own [religious] institutions 
outside the denominations.”6 As an example, elite Southern women 
participated in the American Sunday School Union since its 
inception in 1817. Females in the organization created Christian 
Sunday schools for children in the country’s rural areas. 7 
Participation in such a society granted elite women decades of 
experience in spreading Christianity throughout the South by the 
war’s start. 
 Southern women’s prewar religiosity convinced at least 
some of them that antebellum presidents had the authority to declare 
national fasts. Mary Jeffreys Bethell, a slaveholder from North 
Carolina, wrote on January 1, 1861 that “South Carolina has seceded, 
the states are making every preparation for War[.] Next Friday is the 
day set apart for prayer and fasting by the President Buchanan, that 
God would save us from Civil War and blood guiltiness.”8 Historian 
Harry Stout observes that this “national fast day for peace and 
reconciliation proclaimed by President Buchanan for January 4, 
1861, failed miserably” for Southern clergy and laypeople alike.9 
However, Bethell did not question Buchanan’s right to establish that 
9
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fast—she instead accepted his authority to do so and even 
appreciated the fast’s objective of preventing civil war. 
 The second factor predisposing elite Southern women’s 
appeal for fasting days was the group’s reverence for Jefferson 
Davis. Such admiration exceeded their former support for 
antebellum presidents and often lasted throughout the war. If, like 
Bethell, elite women appreciated national fasting days, their respect 
for Davis made them all the more likely to comply with Confederate 
fasts. As historian Drew Faust explains, those women believed that 
“institutions of power were extensions of divine government.  God 
had delegated his power to white men…. In the view of many 
southern women, this created a continuum of power with God the 
highest master, a patriarch one level of command above Jefferson 
Davis.”10 In many elite Southern women’s minds, Davis led a nation 
that defended their livelihoods from Union aggression and thus 
deserved their respect. Even after the Confederacy’s surrender, 
Gertrude Thomas, a plantation mistress from Georgia, wrote in May 
of 1865 that her “womanly sympathys [sic] go out for Jeff Davis and 
I do hope and pray that he will escape. Not to save my right arm 
would I betray him if I knew where he was and yet I was beginning 
to think him despotic.”11 One month after the Confederacy’s defeat, 
Southern women like Thomas still refused to abandon Davis or their 
“womanly sympathys” for him.12 
 Ultimately, both elite Southern women’s religiosity and 
support for Davis compelled them to attend fast-day church services. 
This obligation proved strong enough that when they could not meet 
it, some women voiced frustrations. During a national fast in May 
of 1862, Kate Carney, a daughter of a wealthy merchant who lived 
in Union-occupied Murfreesboro, Tennessee, wrote that it “was the 
Fast day appointed by Jeff Davis, and we kept it until dinner, though 
we had no service in our churches. It seems hard that we are not 
permitted to pray to God, when and how we want to.”13 In Carney’s 
opinion, the fault of the fast that Davis declared lay not in 
governmental overreach, but in that the Union occupation 
undermined her city’s ability to provide church services for her to 
attend. Carney felt exasperated with her inability to connect with 
God to the extent that she desired. She considered the fast a religious 
10
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privilege that should have provided her with church services and the 
sermons that ministers delivered therein. Carney’s testimony 
bolsters the notion that elite Southern women eagerly attended fast-
day church services, which paved the way for their eventual belief 
in the utility of fasting for Confederate military success.  
   
The Saliency of Sermons: Views on Fasting in the War’s First 
Year 
 
 However, simply attending these fast-day church services 
was not sufficient for the aforementioned development. Rather, elite 
Southern women’s evolving takeaways from the sermons at these 
services shaped the course of their views on wartime fasting.  
In the war’s first year, Southern ministers used national fasts 
to proclaim that God blessed the Confederacy. Henry Tucker, a 
Baptist minister from Georgia, delivered a sermon to his state’s 
legislature on November 15, 1861, a date that “HIS EXCELLENCY 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES” 
designated a fasting day.14 Though he spoke directly to the Georgia 
state legislature, Tucker’s sermon typified how Confederate 
ministers from various denominations vindicated the Confederacy 
in the first year of the conflict.15 He recognized his audience in 
exclaiming, “My countrymen! It is right for us to resort to all the 
means of defence [sic] which Providence has placed within our 
reach. It is proper to call into action our best civil and military talent, 
to strain every energy to the utmost in supplying the material of war. 
As for that sublime faith which we have in the unconquerable valor 
of our troops, I admire it, I partake in it.”16 Tucker supported the 
Confederacy as a nation for which God provided. Though he did not 
claim the South invincible, his defense of the “unconquerable valor” 
of Confederate troops likely appealed to those Southerners who felt 
unsure about the Confederacy’s chances of victory.17   
Presbyterian minister Thomas Verner Moore’s fast-day 
sermon to a congregation in Richmond, Virginia on November 15, 
1861 stressed similarly God’s favorable interpretation of the South. 
In his sermon, Moore claimed “that there has never been an army 
since the time of Cromwell, in which there was a more pervading 
11
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sense of the power of God than our own…. The resources of the 
mighty organization [the United States], whose stupendous gage of 
battle we fearlessly took up, were so vast in men, money, munitions 
of war, forts, fleets and armies, that unless God had been with us we 
must have been crushed.”18 Moore considered Confederate military 
victories against the North’s superior numbers and supplies proof of 
God’s blessing of the South. The later publication of Tucker’s and 
Moore’s sermons, in addition to other sermons that replicated their 
espousals of Confederate righteousness, enabled their messages to 
reach a broader audience that included elite Southern women.    
Fast-day sermons that echoed the pro-Confederacy 
sentiments of Tucker and Moore helped convince some elite women 
that God blessed the South in the war’s first year. Those women 
allowed Southern clergymen’s promises of God’s favor to augment 
their Confederate patriotism. In June of 1861, Judith McGuire, an 
Episcopal Confederate nurse who lived in Richmond and considered 
herself a “Lady of Virginia,” wrote: “Yesterday was set apart by the 
President as a day of prayer and fasting, and I trust that throughout 
the Confederacy the blessing of God was invoked upon the army 
and country. We went to church at Millwood and heard Bishop 
Meade. His sermon was full of wisdom and love…. He is full of 
enthusiasm and zeal for our cause.” 19  McGuire’s attendance of 
Meade’s sermon reinforced, if not created, her belief that God 
favored the South. She stated that Meade “says that if our ancestors 
had good reason for taking up arms in 1775, surely we had much 
better, for the oppression they suffered from the mother-country was 
not a tithe of the provocation we have received from the Government 
at Washington.”20 Meade’s sermon buttressed McGuire’s belief in 
the South’s right to secede and mitigated the uncertainties she may 
have harbored regarding the Confederacy’s formation.       
In defending the Confederacy and proposing God’s favor of 
the South, fast-day sermons assuaged the early-war anxieties that 
some Southern women possessed. Elite women who attended fast-
day services described how Southern ministers’ enthusiasm for the 
CSA directed them away from fear and towards allegiance to the 
Confederacy. Margaret Crawford Adams, the wife of a former 
American Minister to Spain, lived in South Carolina at the start of 
12
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 8 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol8/iss2/1
 
 
“Stirring Appeals” 
 
13 
the war. She recorded the story of a female friend who, shortly after 
South Carolina seceded, “called to see me…. The only topic of 
conversation then was the prospect of war. My friend said: ‘I do not 
approve of this thing. What do I care for patriotism? My husband is 
my country. What is country to me if he be killed…. I will have 
poverty and my children will starve.’”21 Yet from this early-war 
anxiety evolved a sense of righteousness of and due sacrifice for the 
Southern cause. That fasting day relieved Adams’s friend, who, 
“coming out of church, on a day appointed for fasting and prayer, 
where we had listened to one of the great Dr. Thornwell’s stirring 
appeals…said to me [Adams]: ‘I feel that I could do deeds of 
heroism.’”22 Thornwell’s oration does not exist in print, but it likely 
echoed other early-war sermons’ assertions that God blessed the 
Confederacy. Adams recorded her recollections in 1903 and may 
have mistaken some of her story’s details. Despite this, her reference 
to how Thornwell’s message relieved her friend’s apprehensions 
reveals her long-held belief that fasting-day services calmed elite 
women’s early-war fears. 
Elite women who attended fasting services in the war’s first 
year rarely discussed their desires for collective Southern adherence 
to national fasts. When they did, they seldom mentioned the tangible 
threats against which Southerners could defend themselves by 
unifying as a Christian populace. Instead, they made general 
statements that revealed only their personal preferences for religious 
unity. On a fasting day in April of 1862, Kate Cumming, an 
Episcopal Confederate nurse from Alabama, recorded that “I hope 
it [the public fast] will be duly observed. I believe that it is well kept 
in the army. There has been no show of keeping it in this hospital; 
the excuse is given – ‘too much to do.’”23 Cumming did not note 
that she believed Southern unity during the fast would cause future 
military success or relieve civilians’ hardships. Her frustrations 
reveal only her personal desire for Christian solidarity.   
Like Cumming, Judith McGuire discovered in Confederate 
fasts chances to gather with other Southerners in support of the 
South and its Christian identity. On November 15, 1861, McGuire 
recorded that it “was fast-day – a national fast proclaimed by our 
President. I trust that every church in the Confederacy was well 
13
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filled with heart-worshippers…. This whole household was there [at 
church] – indeed, the whole neighborhood turned out.”24 McGuire 
might have engaged in wishful thinking when positing that the entire 
South partook in church services. Her residence in the Confederate 
capital, where much of the population likely attended fast-day 
services, may have influenced her belief that the rest of South did 
the same. At no point did she claim, though, that Southern religious 
unity would benefit the Confederacy. These writings of Cumming, 
McGuire, and others imply that elite Southern women had not yet 
constructed their belief in the military benefits of fasting during the 
war’s first year. 
 
The Tide Turns: Views on Fasting in the War’s Second Half  
 
However, by 1863, elite Southern women had suffered 
through enough wartime hardships to challenge their early-war 
opinions about God’s blessing of the South. Confederate military 
defeats at the Battles of Shiloh and Antietam, among others, 
undermined their previous faith in Providence. Personal suffering 
combined with those military losses to create religious difficulties 
for Southern women, a group that felt sure of God’s favor in the 
war’s first year. Historian Drew Faust explains that by 1863, the 
“ever mounting death toll worked its terrible effects on women’s 
sensibilities. By the middle years of the war almost no family 
remained exempt.” 25  Faust contends that for “all God’s 
promises…it was hard to dispel doubt as months of war stretched 
into years and as the pain of individual bereavements mounted 
almost beyond endurance….” 26  In Southern women’s opinions, 
ministers’ early-war promise that God blessed the South had not 
materialized.      
Despite years of wartime hardships, Southern women’s 
religiosity inspired them to continue engaging in fasting days. 
Following the South’s deadliest defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg, 
elite women continued to note their adherence to national fasts. In 
August of 1863, Ellen Virginia Saunders, an Alabama woman with 
family members who served as officers in the Confederate military, 
noted a “proclamation by President Davis making this a day of 
14
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humiliation, fasting, and prayer. Ah, how many prayers are wafted 
to the throne of Light this day for fathers, husbands, brothers, sons, 
and lovers! May God on high hear us!” 27  Confederate military 
defeats did not undermine Saunders’s desire to engage in the 
national fast. Her religious convictions sustained her desire to join 
others and pray for her country and loved ones.   
Even at the end of the war, a sense of Christian obligation 
compelled some elite women to comply with fasts. Eliza Frances 
Andrews, a Methodist who experienced the war’s end from a 
Georgia plantation, wrote that March 10, 1865 was a “day of public 
fasting and prayer for our poor country…. After dinner the 
gentlemen proposed a row on the lake, but Mrs. Maxwell and I were 
the only ones that had fasted and we wouldn’t indulge in a frolic, 
and the others said they were afraid they might be drowned for their 
sins….”28 Though Andrews realized the dire state of her nation, her 
religiosity compelled her and Mrs. Maxwell to fast for their country.   
Elite Southern women whose Christian convictions 
prompted them to attend fast-day services in the conflict’s second 
half heard messages that differed from early-war sermons. Southern 
ministers altered their early-war fasting sermons to offer religious 
explanations for previous Confederate military failures and 
Southern hardships. From 1863 to the war’s end, Southern ministers 
used fasting days to argue that God had punished the Confederacy 
for its people’s sins. Historian Drew Faust explains that in the 
opinions of Southern clergymen, “setbacks had to be seen as 
warnings that called upon southerners to cleanse themselves of 
wickedness and impiety, to transform themselves and their world to 
find God’s favor.”29 Episcopal minister Stephen Elliott explained 
the cause of Confederate hardships when he delivered a fast-day 
sermon to a Georgia congregation in August of 1863, one month 
after Confederate defeat at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. He stated: 
 
In turning ourselves, therefore to God in fasting and prayer, let 
us truly humble ourselves and beseech Him to show us our own 
hearts and to convict us especially of those sins which are 
offensive to him and which have placed us in the wrong way[.] 
There should be great searchings [sic] of heart to-day [sic]. From 
15
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the President of the Confederate States, who now occupies, for 
a time, the most responsible position in the world, to the 
humblest person who is involved in their destiny, each one of us 
should examine himself and find out, if possible, wherein he has 
offended God and turned away his face from us.30 
 
Elliott posited that every Confederate person had an obligation to 
discern what they did to incur God’s wrath on the South. All 
Southerners needed to improve their religious adherence to elicit 
God’s favor as the war continued; failing to do so would harm the 
entire Confederacy, not just those who refused to comply. 
Post-1862 fast-day sermons convinced some elite women 
that God’s blessing of the South required collective adherence to 
Confederate fasts. Elite women’s compliance with fasting days no 
longer calmed their wartime fears. Rather, those women wished to 
ensure that other Southerners participated with them. Judith 
McGuire discussed her experiences during a Confederate fast in 
March of 1863: “To-day [sic] was set apart by the President as a day 
of fasting and prayer. Some of us went to Richmond and joined in 
the services at St. Paul's.”31 McGuire’s residence in Richmond put 
her near Davis, whom she wrote was “in church…. One of the ladies 
of the hospital, seeing this morning two rough-looking convalescent 
soldiers sitting by the stove, exhorted them to observe the day by 
prayer and fasting.” 32  Though McGuire did not mention what 
ministers argued in their fast-day sermons, they likely mimicked 
Elliott’s emphasis on Southern religious unity.   
That message inspired one of the nurses to undermine 
antebellum gender roles, which stressed feminine deference to men, 
and to rebuke soldiers who did not adhere to the fast. According to 
McGuire, one of those soldiers “seemed to have no objection to the 
praying, but could not see the ‘good of fasting,’ and doubted very 
much whether ‘Marse Jeff fasted all day himself—do you reckon he 
does?’ The lady laughingly told him that she would inquire and let 
them know, but she reckoned that such was his habit.”33 The nurse’s 
desire to persuade the soldiers to observe the fast inspired her to 
confront Davis’s wife and ask her about her husband’s fast-day 
habits. McGuire contends that Mrs. Davis claimed “‘that Mr. Davis 
never eats on fast-day, and…as soon as he returns from church he 
16
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shuts himself up in his study, and is never interrupted during the day, 
except on public business.’ Of course, this was soon given as an 
example, not only to the two convalescents, but to the whole 
hospital.”34   
Unlike in the war’s first year, by 1863 McGuire no longer 
exclaimed that she trusted in God’s blessing. Nor did she imply that 
her adherence to the fast calmed her wartime fears. Instead, she 
recorded how she and other nurses took it upon themselves to ensure 
Confederate fast-day compliance. McGuire’s residence in the 
Confederacy’s capital and her proximity to the president may have 
influenced her favorable interpretation of Davis’s fast-day routine. 
Yet her reference to other nurses’ efforts to promote the fast reveals 
how a wider base of elite women emphasized Southern religious 
unity by 1863.   
The belief that God’s blessing of the Confederacy required 
communal adherence to fasts drove some women to admonish 
Confederate officers for their irreligiosity. Kate Cumming wrote 
about a Confederate fast in August of 1863, one month after 
Southern defeat at the battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. She 
stated that “Our chapel is finished.  Mr. Green preached in it, and an 
excellent sermon he gave us; it was quite stirring and 
encouraging….”35 Though Mr. Green’s sermon does not exist in 
print, he gave it in the same month that Stephen Elliott delivered 
Ezra’s Dilemna, and thus likely stressed Confederate religious 
unity.36 That message resonated with Cumming, who on the same 
day recounted: 
 
The morning services were pretty well attended by the privates; 
some of the officers instead of going played checkers. I had a 
conversation with one of them on the subject, and told him that 
the war would not close until men gave God the homage which 
he demanded. He did not agree with me; I asked him if he 
believed the Bible. He answered yes. I then asked him if he and 
the others had obeyed the commands in it, in seemingly grudging 
to give God that one day. I said nothing more, but was gratified 
to see him attend the afternoon service.37   
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Cumming did not assert that her attendance of Green’s sermon 
resolved her concerns regarding the war. Instead, that sermon 
seemed to convince her of Confederate religious unity’s importance. 
Unlike in the war’s first year, when she felt frustrated about a lack 
of adherence to a fast but did nothing to combat it, Cumming 
admonished a Confederate officer who did not meet her standard of 
religious commitment. Her desire for Confederate victory drove her 
to disregard propriety and ensure attendance at fast-day services.  
 After 1862, elite Southern women expressed vexation when 
they could not match other Southerners’ commitment to fasts. 
During a Confederate fasting day in August of 1864, Susan Bradford 
Eppes, a Methodist who lived on a Florida plantation, noted: “This 
is a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer. Our armies in Virginia 
and in the West have suffered reverses of late…. All who can, go to 
church; all the churches hold services…. Some stay all day, for they 
are fasting, but Father will not let us fast absolutely…. Father in 
Heaven, take care of our poor boys!”38 Eppes’s Florida residence 
and reference to recent Confederate military defeats reveals how 
those losses affected elite women throughout the South. That her 
mention of fast-day unity follows her note regarding military 
failures implies that she considered collective Southern adherence 
necessary to forestalling future losses. Eppes did not admonish other 
Confederates for their irreligiosity; after all, she witnessed uniform 
attendance of fast-day services. Instead, her statement that her father 
would not let her fast throughout the day reveals that she wished to 
emulate other Southerners’ religious commitment. Eppes did not 
state that fast-day services calmed her anxieties about the war or 
convinced her of God’s blessing. Rather, she likely believed that 
collective fasting could implore God to support the Confederacy’s 
future.   
All of the above demonstrated that by 1863, elite women 
rarely mentioned that fasting days calmed their fears, and rather 
stressed collective fast-day adherence. However, Mary Jeffreys 
Bethell presents one potential exception to this argument. Bethell’s 
husband represented North Carolina in fighting for the Confederacy. 
She discussed her opinions of God after watching her husband leave 
home for the fight in November of 1864: “My husband started to the 
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army yesterday for Godsboro, he will get back to Court on a 
furlough…. I continue to look to God, I do trust in him, but I am 
tempted and tryed [sic].”39 Bethell’s husband’s departure into a war 
that she knew caused suffering made her question the deity that 
allowed that to happen. Yet in that same entry Bethell went on to 
write that “I went to Union today to prayer meeting, it was public 
fast day. We had a profitable time at Church, good deal of feeling. 
Read the Bible and exhorted, we sung several hymns. I have 
received comfort this evening my trouble is gone, my soul is happy, 
hallelujah. I will praise the Lord forever, he has answered me.”40 
Bethell did not consider Southern religious unity during the fast 
necessary for relieving her anxieties. Despite this, her attendance of 
a fast-day prayer meeting, and not a sermon, reveals that she likely 
did not hear Southern ministers’ appeals for religious unity. Had she 
attended a sermon, she may have joined her contemporaries in 
stressing collective Southern engagement with national fasts.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Given their religious commitment in the antebellum era, it 
should not surprise anyone that elite Southern women adhered to 
Confederate fasts throughout the Civil War. Nor does it appear 
strange that post-1862 fasting sermons inspired them to wish for 
collective Southern compliance with those fasts. But given the 
nuance of Southern fasting days in the conflict’s historical period, it 
initially seems peculiar that elite Confederate women supported 
them so strenuously. As historian Harry Stout explains, “The 
ascendance of the public fast in the Confederacy…is truly 
remarkable. Through all of American history up to 1860, public fasts 
had been quintessentially Northern and ‘Puritan.’ Yet, when 
secession came to war, the Confederacy would employ the public 
fast more frequently than the North.”41 In this sense, the Civil War 
might have served as a watershed moment in American religious 
history—a period during which Southern Christian adherence 
surpassed Northern religiosity.   
But if this were the case for the entire Southern populace, it 
would undermine the fact that elite Southern women rarely—if 
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ever—challenged or found odd those days of fasting. Such a view 
forgets that those women exited the antebellum era with religious 
dispositions that inclined them to emphasize public fasts throughout 
the war. With these thoughts in mind, the Civil War served as a 
watershed moment in Southern American religious history only in 
the sense that CSA officials acted in ways that reaffirmed their 
civilians’ Christianity and allowed the Confederate government to 
approach those civilians’ levels of religious conviction. One of the 
principal ways in which that government drew closer to the 
religiosity of its civilians—and especially that of its female 
civilians—was through its enactment of national fasts.  
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Overseers’ Quest for Control in the WPA Slave 
Narratives 
 
Delia Karamouzis 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
William Scarborough, a notable historian of the American 
South, claims that “no figure occupied a position of greater 
importance in the managerial hierarchy of the southern plantation 
system than did the overseer.”1 Scarborough challenges the myth 
of the overseer as “an uncouth, uneducated, dissolute, inept slave 
driver” and instead argues that these descriptions were largely a 
construct of the members of the planter class. In “Plantation 
Overseers and Their World: The Stereotype, Life and Image,” 
Robert Wayne Webber substantiates Scarborough’s claim, 
asserting that “When we think of overseers today, we visualize an 
evil white man with a whip. As this image would lead us to 
believe, overseers are pictured as violent, amoral, brutal, cruel 
and uncaring…and this cruelty has overshadowed a true 
understanding of overseers and they have become a caricature of 
base ignorance and cruelty.”2 This paper will seek to refute the 
claims of both Scarborough and Webber through an examination 
of overseers as presented in the Works Progress Administration 
Slave Narratives.3 It will argue that this “caricature” of overseers 
as “violent, amoral, brutal, cruel and uncaring” is largely merited, 
as overseers sought to assert physical, psychological, and sexual 
control over slaves through the use of both ritual and 
unpredictable violence.4   
This essay examines the WPA Narratives collected by the 
Federal Writer’s Project of former slaves.5 These sources contain 
interviews from over two thousand former slaves in seventeen 
states, describing their time in bondage. Scholars readily 
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acknowledge that these interviews are flawed. While over two 
thousand slaves were interviewed, these individuals were not 
necessarily representative. Most interviewees were urban, male 
house slaves, and samples of former slaves were 
disproportionately high in some states compared to others. Rural 
residents and enslaved field workers remain largely 
underrepresented in the interviews, though both skilled and 
unskilled workers enjoyed representation.6 
The ages of the ex-slaves also raise questions about the 
validity of their testimonies, as more than two-thirds of the 
interviewees were over eighty years old at the time of their 
interviews. Many scholars debate the effects of failing memory 
on the descriptions of slavery provided in the interviews, as 
historical recollections are often subjective in nature. Historians 
also examine the extent to which the interviewees truly 
experienced the harsh realities of slavery as children, or whether 
their experiences of the peculiar institution were colored by their 
youth. 7  Similarly, other scholars inquire whether the long 
lifespans of the former slaves interviewed indicate that they were 
treated better, or experienced fewer punishments than those of a 
typical slave. 
The problem of age and memory is particularly relevant 
to the discussion of overseers. Former slaves’ perception of 
overseers is largely correlated to the degree to which they were 
directly exposed to them. Many former slaves interviewed were 
children during the time of slavery, thus much of what they know 
about overseers may have been influenced by the experiences and 
comments of their parents who worked under overseers in the 
fields. The brutality of overseers differed by plantation and by 
region especially, with a tendency towards more severe violence 
in the Deep South—specifically on rice plantations. Finally, 
particular attention must be paid to the fact that a sizable number 
of the slaves interviewed were house slaves, as this significantly 
affected their interactions and perceptions of the overseer.   
Despite the obvious flaws of these sources, one cannot 
ignore the historical value in the “candor” these interviews 
provide.8 These narratives offer unprecedented access into the 
stories of slavery from the mouths of those who experienced and 
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witnessed the peculiar institution firsthand, and further serve as 
indispensable resources in capturing the expansiveness of the 
enslaved experience. In spite of the risks they faced, numerous 
slaves felt compelled to share their experiences so future 
generations would know the realities of slavery—even if some of 
their messages were rather indirect. Interviewers often adopted 
patronizing, condescending and paternalistic tones in their 
interviews, due to the climate of race relations that existed during 
the Great Depression.9 Escott notes that as a result of these racial 
power dynamics between interviewers and interviewees, former 
slaves often turned to more nuanced methods of communication 
to convey substantive descriptions or realities of their 
experience. 10  Despite the strong biases and attitudes of 
paternalism and white supremacy that color many of the 
interviews, the shrewd ability by which the former slaves 
communicated provides readers with a windfall of valuable 
information that allows us to better understand the nature of the 
“peculiar institution” and, more specifically, comprehend the 
roles of overseers and the dynamics that existed between the 
enslaved and their overseers on the plantation.11  
 
Plantation Overseers: Their Duties and Responsibilities 
 
To provide some historical context on the subject at hand, 
an overview of overseers’ obligations would prove beneficial. 
Overseers had wide-ranging duties and responsibilities on the 
plantation, typically specified in written contracts with masters. 
In Down By the Riverside, Charles Joyner wrote that one master 
included stipulations into his overseer’s contract, specifying that 
his performance “would be judged first and foremost by the 
general well being of the negroes, their cleanly appearance, 
respectful manners, active and vigorous obedience, their 
completion of tasks well and early, the small amount of 
punishment; the excess of births over deaths; the small number of 
people in the hospital, and the health of children.” Joyner noted, 
however, that “overseers varied in their effectiveness in carrying 
out the planters’ desires.”12 Joyner also cautions that masters’ 
primary goals—absolutely clear even if unstated—were to make 
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a profit, thus any admonitions that overseers take good care of the 
enslaved were secondary concerns.  
As recollected in the narratives, awakening the slaves 
each day to begin work represented one of the main duties of 
overseers. Reverend Silas Jackson recalled arising each morning 
before sunrise to the sound of the overseer’s horn.13 Alec Pope 
also described waking up each morning at four o’clock at the 
command of his overseer.14 “Just like yesterday – I hear the old 
overseer making round of the cabins every day at four, and I 
means in the morning too, when the night sleep is the best, and 
folkses tumbling out of the door getting ready for the fields,” 
added Daniel William Lucas.15 After slaves arose each morning, 
overseers urgently directed them to the fields, often with no time 
to tend to their families or eat before their labor began. “All de 
slaves dat was field hands, dey had to work mighty hard. De 
overseer, he pretty rough sometimes. He tell em what time to get 
up en sound de horn for dat time. Had to go to work fore daybreak 
en if dey didn’ be dere on time en work like dey ought to, de 
overseer sho whip dem,” described Charlie Grant.16 “The Negro 
overseer would wake up the slaves and have them in the field 
before they could see how to work each morning,” Robert 
Grinstead testified, “and as they would go to work so soon their 
breakfast was carried to the field to them.”17  
One cannot understate the deliberate and prominent 
inclusion of being awoken by the overseer each morning. The 
narratives’ common mentioning of this seemingly trivial fact after 
several decades, unprompted by the interviewer, deserves 
attention as it conveys the psychological authority that overseers 
maintained over slaves. Slaves started and concluded each day at 
the command of the overseer, and evidently resented the 
psychological governance of overseers over their period of rest—
one of the most vulnerable shared experiences of human beings.   
Once the slaves began their labor, the overseer harbored 
responsibility for seeing that the slaves worked efficiently. 
George Womble observed, “An overseer was hired by the master 
to see that the work was done properly.”18 The overseer was also 
in charge of dismissing slaves once their work had been 
completed and inspected, the latter of which consisted of 
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checking their rows or counting the number of crops picked.  
Slaves faced the constant threat of violence from overseers, and 
Mary James described that this threat was realized if overseers 
believed the slaves were working at an insufficient pace.19 “De 
oberseer dat we had was right mean to us when we didn’ work 
our rows as fas’ as de others, an’ sometime he whup us, wimmen 
an’all,” added Clare C. Young.20  
Another duty of the overseer was handling the passes that 
enabled slaves to travel between plantations. Reverend Silas 
Jackson explained, “When we could get work, or work on 
someone else’s place, we got a pass from the overseer to go off 
the plantation but had to be back by nine o’clock on Saturday 
night or when cabin inspection was made [by the overseer].”21 
Oftentimes, overseers also served as the principal means of 
medical care for slaves. Bert Mayfield stated, “At that time there 
were few doctors and when the slaves would get hurt or sick, they 
were usually looked after by the master or by their overseer.”22 
However, utilizing the services of doctors proved rare since 
masters viewed doctors as inconvenient and expensive.  
The overseer’s duties extended beyond the mere labor of 
the slaves. Overseers usually supervised the personal and spiritual 
lives of the slaves as well, largely as a means of demonstrating 
ubiquitous psychological control. Anthony Dawson revealed, 
“The overlooker made everybody clean up and wash de children 
up [On Sundays].”23 The overseer even oversaw the worship of 
the slaves; Reverend Silas Jackson recalled, “On Sunday the 
slaves who wanted to worship would gather at one of the large 
cabins with one of the overseers and have their church. After 
which the overseer would talk. When communion was given the 
overseer was paid for staying there with half the collection taken 
up, some time he would get 25 cents.”24 Not only did overseers 
attempt to control the labor of the enslaved, but they also tried to 
exert psychological control over the precious personal time that 
slaves had away from labor. 
Lastly, overseers’ duties included other responsibilities 
specified by masters, which varied from plantation to plantation. 
Mary James noted, “In the quarters we had furniture made by the 
overseer and the colored carpenters; they would make the tables, 
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benches and beds for everybody.”25 Alexander Scaife recalled, 
“Overseers I recollects was, Mr. Sam Hughes, Mr. Tom Baldwin, 
and Mr. Whitfield Davis. Mr. Baldwin was de best to me. He had 
a still-house out in a field whar liquor was made. I tote it fer him. 
We made good corn liquor.” 26  Overseers often also had 
connections to patrollers, Reverend Silas Jackson observed, and 
were always on the lookout for runaway slaves from other 
plantations, in the hopes of reaping rewards for their capture.27 
When asked about the duties of overseers, Andy Marion replied, 
“All de overseer done was to wake us up, see to feeding stock, 
and act biggity.”28 In short, overseers possessed a great number 
of responsibilities from which they derived authority to subjugate 
their slaves, a reality which will be further expanded upon 
throughout the paper.  
 
Plantation Overseers: Who Were They? 
 
Besides understanding their duties—and to better 
comprehend their motivations—one should recognize exactly 
who overseers were. The narratives routinely describe overseers 
as “poor men.” Perry Lewis affirmed that the majority of poor 
white men in Maryland served as overseers.29 “Our overseer was 
a poor man,” detailed Harriet Robinson, “He was paid to be head 
of punishment.”30 As William Wiethoff observed, both whites 
and blacks served as overseers.31 White overseers were typically 
poor males who sought to collect both income and experience in 
running a plantation, with the aim of one day becoming a master. 
White overseers served as the authority figure on the plantation 
in the absence of the master, as clarified by Mrs. M.S. Fayman 
who stated, “[The plantation] contained 8000 acres, of which 
more than 6000 acres were under cultivation, and having about 
350 colored slaves and 5 or 6 overseers all of who were white. 
The overseers were the overlords of the manor; as Haynes [her 
Master] dealt extensively in tobacco and trading in slaves, he was 
away from the plantation nearly all the time.”32  
Perceptions of white overseers varied from slave to slave. 
A common freedmen’s epitaph for overseers was “poor white 
trash.” Slaves favored this term as it offered them an opportunity 
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to regain some of the control and agency that overseers so 
insatiably demanded. The term “poor white trash,” however, was 
not a socioeconomic evaluation of overseers but rather a moral, 
social, and ethical evaluation. White overseers enjoyed special 
economic privileges by virtue of their race and status as an 
overseer, such as sharing a house with the master on the plantation. 
Stephen McCray explained, “Master had a brick house for hisself 
and the overseer. They was the only ones on the place.”33 When 
asked about her overseer, Emma Howard responded, “How did 
we feel ‘bout a white man who would be over-looker? We called 
him ‘po white trash, He wasn’t thought much of by anybody.”34 
Similarly, Hal Huston attested, “All of us niggers called all the 
whites ‘poor white trash.’ The overseer was nothing but poor 
white trash and the meanest man that ever walked on earth.”35 In 
an interview with Ben Horry of South Carolina, the interviewer 
wrote, “On Waccamaw – and same true of all south as all know – 
white overseers worst kind of ‘white trash’ – respected less by 
negroes than by whites.”36 
Some slaves pointed to the racial divide that existed 
between white overseers and their slaves as the source of hatred 
and tension. Hannah McFarland observed, “The overseer was sho’ 
nothing but poor white trash, the kind who didn’t like niggers and 
dey still don’t, old devils. Don’t let ‘em fool you, dey don’t lak a 
nigger a’tall.”37 Bert Luster echoed McFarland’s sentiments and 
reported, “We didn’t have no mean overseer. Master Astern and 
his son jest told us niggers what to do and we did it, but 50 miles 
away dem niggers had a mean overseer and dey called him ‘poor 
white trash,’ ‘old whooser,’ and sometime ‘old red neck,’ and he 
sho’ would beat ‘em turrible iffen dey didn’t do jest like he 
wanted ‘em to.” 38  Stephen McCray reiterated the prevailing 
attitude toward white overseers when he declared, “He wasn’t 
nothing but white trash. Nothing else in the world but that.”39 One 
ex-slave named Janie Gallman described playing with the 
children of the white overseer as a child, often jumping rope with 
them and spending the night in their house when the overseer left 
the plantation. But despite her intimate relations with the family 
of the overseer, even Gallman referred to the family’s patriarch 
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as “poor white trash,” demonstrating the prevalence of this 
ubiquitous sentiment towards white overseers.40  
White overseers were occasionally relatives of the master, 
usually sons or nephews. Through the employment of relatives, 
masters could retain close ties to their overseers and ensure 
transparency and supervision. Ophelia Whitley recalled, “His 
[master] son Billy wuz de overseer an’ he wuz good ter git along 
wid, but he shore made dem darkies wuck.”41 However, some 
slaves regarded white overseers as inferior to their black 
counterparts, as illustrated by Andy Marion who specified, 
“Master had an overseer twice. They was poor white trash, not as 
good as de niggers.” 42  Thus, the narratives reveal that slaves 
commonly regarded white overseers unfavorably, and slaves’ 
frequent reference to “poor white trash” adequately captured their 
disdain for the white men who would take these violent jobs.  
 Besides lower class white men, black male slaves also 
served as overseers on the plantation. Blacks served in lieu of 
white overseers on some plantations at the desire of the master, 
and they existed alongside and subservient to their white 
counterparts. “Dey had Niggers over de hoers an’ white mens 
over de plow han’s,” remarked Anna Baker. 43  Fred Brown 
remembered having both a white and black overseer: “Massa 
have overseer and overlooker. De overseer am in charge of wo’k 
and de overlooker am in charge of de cullud women.”44 Robert 
Grinstead similarly recalled, “There was one Negro man slave 
who decided to not work after Master went to the War and the 
white overseer was fired and the Negro overseer was acting as an 
overseer.”45 White overseers viewed black overseers as a threat 
to their position and their wages, William Wiethoff argues. 46 
Unlike whites, black overseers still lived in their slave quarters on 
the “street” where slaves resided. Black overseers “could hardly 
aspire to be planters” but their status as an overseer afforded them 
certain privileges, such as better living conditions. 47  Some 
masters exhibited preferences in the race of their overseers, as 
supported by Adele Frost who noted, “My master was kind to his 
slaves an’ his overseer was all Negroes.”48 Lizzie Farmer also 
testified, “My grandpappy was Master Booker’s overseer. He 
wouldn’t have a white man over his niggers.”49  However, other 
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masters merely used black overseers in the absence of available 
whites. Robert Grinstead recalled that when the Civil War broke 
out his master left the plantation in charge of the white overseer 
and his two sisters. Yet, Grinstead added that “as the overseers 
were hard for them to get along with they were oftener without an 
overseer as with one, and therefore they used one of the Negroes 
as overseer for most of the time.”50 Designations proved very 
important to the discussion of white and black overseers. 
According to Anthony Dawson, “We called a white man boss the 
‘overseer,’ but a nigger was an over-looker.”51 Emma Howard 
confirmed this distinction and stated, “Jake was de over-looker. 
He was a great, big cullud man.”52 Some slaves who conducted 
the duties of overseers were not afforded the title of overseer. 
Annie Young Henson testified: “We never had any overseers on 
the plantation, we had an old colored man by the name of Peter 
Taylor. His orders were law, if you wanted to please Mistress and 
Master, obey old Peter.”53  
Similar to white overseers, black overseers passed the 
position of the overseer down among families. “My father was the 
colored overseer,” recalled Richard Macks, “He had charge of the 
entire population and continued until he was too old to work, then 
mother’s brother took it over, his name was Caleb.”54 Lou Smith 
also explained, “Old Master was his own overseer, but my daddy 
was the overlooker. He was purty hard on them [the slaves] too, 
as they had to work just like they never got tired.”55 Anthony 
Dawson testified, “One of them [overseers] was my pappy’s 
brother. His name was John, and he was my master’s overlooker. 
John could read and write and figger, and old Master didn’t have 
no white overseer.”56  
Slaves harbored different perceptions of the violence of 
white overseers and black overseers. Some found white overseers 
more violent, while others found black overseers tougher in 
inflicting punishments. William Curtis declared, “Old Master was 
good to all of his slaves but his overseers had order to make ‘em 
work…Colored overseers was worse to whip than white ones, but 
Master allus said, ‘Hadn’t you all rather have a nigger overseer 
than a white one? I don’t want no white man over my niggers.’”57 
In contrast, Ben Horry argued that in his experience, white 
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overseers inflicted more brutal punishments as a method of self-
preservation for their own livelihood, while black overseers 
showed more mercy. Horry compared his experience with both 
black and white overseers when he stated, “Negro over seer – just 
fresh out of Africa TURNED LOOSE. White obersheer a little 
different for one reason! White obersheer want to hold his job… 
Nigger obersheer don’t care too much. He know he going to stay 
on plantation anyhow.”58 However, the interviewer noted at the 
end of Horry’s interview his statement that the “cruel negro 
overseer was shot down after Freedom – blood still on the ground 
because he led Yankees to where silver, etc., was buried.”59 It is 
true that “white overseers, according to the Slave Narratives, 
tended to be harsher and stricter than black overseers,” but as 
demonstrated above this varied from plantation to plantation. 60 
 
The Violence of Plantation Overseers 
 
In spite of these racial differences, the principle 
characteristic underlying both black and white overseers was their 
routine use of ritual and predictable violence. This practice 
asserted both physical and psychological control over the 
enslaved. “Massa would only whup a slave fer two things,” 
recounted Emma Howard, “One thing was if things warn’t done 
up jes’ right at hog killin’ time, and de other was iffen a nigger 
warn’t clean when ‘ported for work on Monday mornin’s. Ol’ 
Massa didn’t do de whuppin’ hisse’f. Jake [overseer] did it, but 
Massa sat dar on his horse to see dat only a certain number of 
licks was given.” 61  Daniel William Lucas recalled the 
psychological burden of violence he faced at the hands of his 
overseer during his work in the field: “The old sun’s a-grinning 
down like he was saying: ‘work, niggers, work!’ And the overseer 
is saying the same thing, only we pays more attention to him 
‘cause of the whip he shakes around when the going gets kinder 
slow down the row.”62 Richard Macks similarly reflected on his 
labor on a large tobacco plantation in Southern Maryland: “Men, 
women and children had to work hard to produce the required 
crops. The slaves did the work and they were driven at full speed 
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sometimes by the owners and others by both owner and 
overseers.”63  
According to what the former slaves told their WPA 
interviewers, working too slowly represented one of the most 
common reasons overseers inflicted violence. Mary James 
denounced the capriciousness of the work pace—the white men’s 
“fancy”—when she reported: “The overseer lived on the farm. He 
would whip men and women and children if he thought they were 
not working fast… The slaves were whipped for not working fast 
or anything that suited the fancy of the master or the overseer.”64 
Reverend Silas Jackson remembered, “The slaves were driven at 
top speed and whipped at the snap of a finger, by the overseers, 
we had four overseers on the farm all hired white men. I have seen 
men beaten until they dropped in their tracks or knocked over by 
clubs, women stripped won to their waist and cowhided.” 65 
Jackson, like James, highlighted that whipping was not 
scientifically administered for a set pace by using the phrase “at 
the snap of a finger.” Robert Grinstead recalled an ingenious and 
sadistic method one overseer used to get a young slave to work 
faster: 
 
“One morning the breakfast was taken to the field and the slaves 
were hoeing cotton and among them a lad about 15 years of age 
who could not hoe as fast as the older slaves and the breakfast 
was sat at the end of the rows and as they would hoe out to the 
end they would eat, and if you would be late hoeing to the end 
the first to go to the end would began eating and eat everything. 
So, this 15 year old lad in order to get out to eat before 
everything was gone did no hoe his row good and the overseer, 
who was white at this time, whipped him so severely that he 
could not eat nor work that day.”66  
 
Overseers further abused slaves for taking breaks. “Old 
Marster got kilt in de last year of de war, and Miss Margaret dat 
was our Mistress, run de place wid overseers dat would thrash you 
for all sorts of things,” recalled Mack Taylor.67 “If they ketch you 
leanin’ on your hoe handle, they’d beat you; step out of your task 
a minute or speak to a girl, they’d beat you. Oh, it was hell when 
de overseers was around and de mistress nor none of de young 
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marsters was dere to protect you.” 68  Similarly, Sarah Ross 
recounted how “The slaves arose with the sun to begin their tasks 
in the fields and worked until dusk. They were beaten by the 
overseer if they dared to rest themselves.” 69  Hal Huston 
confirmed others’ testimony: “The overseer’s name was Charlie 
Clark. One day he whipped a man until he was bloody as a pig 
‘cause he went to the mill and stayed too long.”70 
Overseers inflicted particularly brutal punishments for slaves 
who tried running away. Hector Godbold described, “Never 
couldn’ go from one plantation to de other widout dey had a ticket 
wid em. I see Sam Watson catch many of dem dat had run way en 
buff en gag em.”71 Overseers usually sent bloodhounds into the 
woods and surrounding plantations to catch runaway slaves. 
Louisa Gause observed, “Some of de time, when de colored 
people wouldn’ do what dey had been put to do, dey would hide 
in de woods en stay dere till de overseer come after dem. Oh, dey 
would find dem wid de nigger dog. When de overseer would find 
out dey had run away, he would send de nigger dog to hunt 
dem.”72 Mrs. M.S. Fayman also recalled, “One of the overseers 
had a pack of 6 or 8 trained bloodhounds which were used to trace 
escaping slaves.”73  
The bloodhounds, like the overseers they operated under, 
served as not only a physical threat to the slaves, but also a 
psychological one. George G. King offered an example of ritual 
physical punishment that was an effort to assert psychological 
control: “The overseer would come every morning with the same 
question: ‘Will you niggers promise not to run-away no 
more?...One at a time the overseer would lead them from jail to 
cut them with powerful blows from the lash, then drag them back 
to be chained until the next day when more lickings were given 
‘cause they wouldn’t promise.”74  Thus, overseers issued physical 
punishments for slaves that attempted to run away, but also used 
psychological threats, such as the use of bloodhounds, as a means 
of retaining control.  
Yet another means of overseer’s physical control was sexual 
violence. Anna Baker recalled that her mother fled the plantation 
when Anna was a child, and stated that she was too young to know 
the reasons why her mother left. She noted that years later: 
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 “She tol’ me when she come after us, after de war was over, all 
‘bout why she had to run away: It was on ‘count o’ de Nigger 
overseers. Dey kep’ a-tryin’ to mess ‘roun’ wid her an’ she 
wouldn’ have nothin’ to do wid ‘em. One time while she was in 
de fiel’ de overseer asked her to go over to de woods wid him 
an’ she said, ‘All right, I’ll go find a nice place an’ wait.’ She 
jus’ kep’ a-goin. She swum de river an’ run away. She slipped 
back onet or twict at night to see us, but dat was all.”75 
 
Finally, overseers exacted violence on slaves for their failure 
to complete an adequate amount of work under the “task system,” 
which assigned a specific duty or quota for slaves each day. “On 
the farm the slaves were assigned a task to do each day,” 
explained Mrs. M.S. Fayman, “and in the event it was not finished 
they were severely whipped.” 76  James Calhart James 
acknowledged, “We had white overseers on the plantation, they 
worked hard producing rice on a very large scale, late and early. 
I know they were severely punished, especially for not producing 
the amount or work assigned them or for things that the overseers 
thought they should be punished for.”77  Louisa Gause similarly 
explained, “De overseer, he would give you a task to do en you 
had to do it, too, if you never been want your neck broke. Yes, 
mam, de overseer would stock you down en whip you wid a 
buggy whip.” 78  George Womble recalled that slaves received 
lashes for being “careless” in their work and were often forced to 
take their clothes off in the field for a cruel beating. Womble 
further confirmed that slaves producing cotton, who used the 
“gang system” as opposed to the task system, also experienced 
abuse for not producing enough; slaves were whipped when they 
failed to “pick the required three-hundred pounds of cotton 
daily.”79  Alec Pope echoed Womble and in talking about his 
overseers stated, “Dey brushed us if we lagged in de field or cut 
up de cotton. Dey could allus find some fault wid us.”80 
Many overseers expressed violent tendencies, but others 
proved downright sadistic. As noted previously, unpredictable 
and arbitrary violence enabled overseers to assert not just physical 
but also psychological control over the slaves. In their infliction 
of sadistic, violent punishment, overseers sought to deprive slaves 
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of any agency, as slaves possessed no way of mentally preparing 
for the malicious whims of their overseers. The degree of violence 
depended on the capricious mood of the overseer, which was 
often heightened by the presence of alcohol. Overseers commonly 
treated the lashes they inflicted on slaves with salt, pepper, and 
vinegar to prolong and aggravate the pain. Mrs. John Barclay 
attested, “[The overseer] would whip us ‘till we was raw and then 
put pepper and salt in de sores. If he thought we was too slow in 
doin’ anything he would kick us off de groun’ and churn us up 
and down.”81 Barclay’s overseer was creative in his cruelty: “Our 
punishment depended on de mood of de overseer…De over-seer 
would git some coarse cotton cloth to make our work clothes out 
of and den he would make dem so narrow we couldn’t hardly 
walk.”82  
Annie Young recalled another creative albeit brutal 
punishment on a neighboring plantation: “Dey didn’t whip our 
folks much, but one day I saw a overseer on another place. He 
staked a man down with two forked sticks ‘cross his wrist nailed 
in de ground and beat him half to death with a hand saw ‘til it 
drawed blisters. Den he mopped his back wid vinegar, salt and 
pepper. Sometimes dey’d drop dat hot rosin from pine knots on 
dose blisters.” 83  Mary James admitted, “Old Silas Randolph 
[Master] was a mean man to his slaves especially when drunk. He 
and the overseer would always be together, each of whom carried 
a whip and upon the least provocation would whip his slaves.”84  
Overseers imposed whimsical violence to further assert their 
own dominance over the other slaves on the plantation. Charlie 
Grant described an instance in which his overseer “Tie de slaves 
clear de ground by dey thumbs wid nigger cord en make dem 
tiptoe en draw it tight as could be. Pull clothes off dem fore dey 
tie dem up. Dey didn’t care nothin bout it. Let everybody look on 
at it.”85 Several slaves went so far as to refer to their overseers as 
the devil due to their frequent, sadistic punishment. George G. 
King stated, “He was born on two-hundred acres of Hell, but the 
whitefolks called it Samuel Roll’s plantation…kinder small for a 
plantation, but plenty room for that devil overseer to lay on the 
lash.”86 When Charley Williams was asked about the afterlife in 
his interview, he noted: “I never had no children, and it look lak 
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my wife going outlive me, so my mainest hope when I goes on is 
seeing Mammy and Pappy and old Master. Old overseer, I speck, 
was too devilish mean to be thar!”87  
Overseers carried out violence with the tools most readily 
available on the plantation and certain to inflict the most pain. 
Among the most popular of these instruments were the cat o’ nine 
tails. The cat o’nine tails, commonly referred to as the “nine,” 
were multi-tailed, knotted masses of leather that varied in length. 
Overseers used them to brutally slash the skin of their victims. 
“We all hated what they called the ‘nine ninety-nine,’ usually a 
flogging until fell over unconscious or begged for mercy,” Dennis 
Simms reported.88 Hector Godbold also remembered the use of 
the cat o’nine tails: “Sam Watson was a rough old overseer... Sam 
Watson come dere and make dat fellow lay down on a plank in da 
fence jam en he take dat cat o’nine tail he have tie round his waist 
en strike John 75 times. De blood run down off his just like you 
see a stream run in dat woods.”89 Katie Rowe’s overseer similarly 
utilized the cat o’nine tails: “When he go to whip a nigger he make 
him to strip to de waist, and he take a cat-o-nine tails and bring de 
blisters, and den bust de blisters wid a wide strap of leather 
fastened to a stick handle. I seen de blood running out’n many a 
back, all de way from de neck to de waist!”90  
When issuing whippings, overseers almost always forced 
slaves, men and women alike, to strip off their clothing. Not only 
did this tactic exact a more excruciating physical pain, but it also 
demeaned the slaves in front of their peers—another form of 
psychological control. Alec Pope recalled, “Marster brushed us 
sometime, but de overseer most gen’ally done it. I ‘members dey 
used to make ‘omans pull up deir skirts and brushed ‘em wid a 
horse whup or a hickory.”91 Richard Macks described one slave 
on his plantation that refused to allow his owner to whip him. 
Macks continued, “the overseer and several others overpowered 
the slave, tied him, put him across a hogshead and whipped him 
severely for three mornings in succession.”92  This example— 
along with many others—details the combination of both 
unpredictable and ritual punishment to both physically and 
psychologically subjugate rebellious slaves and re-assert control.  
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Master and Mistress Resistance to Overseer Violence 
 
The extreme, sadistic violence carried out by overseers 
often stood in direct conflict with the masters’ objectification of 
the enslaved. To prevent the damage of their investment, many 
masters verbally condemned overseers’ brute violence. Overseers 
were acutely aware of the admonitions of their masters, and so 
they threatened slaves with death to prevent them from reporting 
such violence. Clare C. Young described the death of her cousin 
at the hands of an overseer and recalled, “I heard tell one time, 
tho’, of de hired man (he was a nigger) an’ de oberseer whuppin’ 
one of my cousins ‘til she bled; she was jes’ sebenteen years old 
an’ was in de fambly way fer de fust time, an’ couldn’ work as 
hard as de rest. Nex’ mawnin’ afte’ dat she died. De hired man 
tol’ de rest if dey said anything ‘bout it to de marster, he’d beat 
dem to death, too, so every’body kep’ quiet an’ quiet an’ de 
marster neber knowed.” 93  Minnie Fulkes told a chilling story 
worth quoting in full:  
 
Honey, I don’t’ like to talk ‘bout dem times, ‘cause my mother 
did suffer misert. You know dar wus an’ overseer who use to tie 
mother up in de barn with a rope aroun’ her arms up over he 
heard, while she stood on a block. Soon as dey got her tied, dis 
block was moved an’ her feet dangled, yo’ know couldn’t tech 
de flo’. Dis ol’ man, now, would start beatin’ her nekkid ‘til the 
blood run down her back to her heels. I took an’ seed th’ whelps 
an’ scars for my own self wid dese here two eyes. After dey had 
beat my muma all dey wanted another overseer. Lord, Lord, I 
hate white people and de flood waters gwine drown some mo. 
Well honey dis man would bathe her in salt and water. Don’t you 
kno’ dem places wuz a hurtin’. Um, um. I asked mother, what 
she done fer ‘en to beat and do her so? She said, ‘nothin’, tother 
than she refused to be wife to dis man. An’ muma say, if he 
didn’t treat her dis way a dozen times, it wasn’t nary one. Mind 
you, now muma’s marster didn’t know dis wus going on. You 
now, if slaves would tell, why dem overseers would kill ‘em.94 
 
Fulkes’s mother refused to marry a man not of her choice, and 
thus paid the price for her defiance. Her mother’s failure to reveal 
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this severe violence to her master illustrates the broader 
psychological fear overseers instilled in the enslaved.   
 To assuage masters’ concerns, overseers sometimes 
justified their violence against slaves when it stemmed from 
disobedience to masters’ commands. Dennis Simms explained: 
“We had to toe the mark or be flogged with a rawhide whip, and 
almost every day there was from two to ten thrashings given on 
the plantations to disobedient Negro slaves. When we behaved we 
were not whipped, but the overseer kept a pretty close eye on us. 
We stuck pretty close to the cabins after dark, for if we were 
caught roaming about we would be unmercifully whipped.”95 
Charley Williams described the unpredictable punishments 
issued by his overseer for disobedience:  
  
“Our overseer was Mr. Simmons, and he was mighty smart and 
had a lot of patience, but he wouldn’t take no talk nor foolishness. 
He didn’t whup nobody very often, but he only had to whup ‘em 
jest one time! He never did whup a nigger at de time the nigger 
done something, but he would wait till evening and have old 
Master come and watch him do it. He never whupped very hard 
‘cept when he had told a nigger something and promised a 
whupping next time and the nigger done it again. Then that 
nigger got what he had been hearing ‘bout!”96  
   
Lucy McCullough detailed a severe whipping she received from 
her overseer as a child on her Master Ned’s plantation for playing 
games in the woods with the other slave children.97 “The woods” 
are often mentioned in connection with disobedience and violence 
in the narratives. Numerous plantations occupied land next to 
rural woods, so slaves typically used this setting as a place of 
refuge from the violence and labor of the plantation.   
 But while overseers abused slaves for failing to follow 
their masters’ commands, sometimes overseers were the ones 
disregarding the masters’ wishes. For example, while many 
masters directed their overseers to teach their slaves the reason 
for their punishment, some overseers whipped slaves for no 
reason at all. Katie Rowe recalled, “Old man Saunders was de 
hardest overseer of anybody. He would git mad and give a 
whipping some time and de slave wouldn’t even know what it was 
39
Mills: The James Blair Historical Review, Volume 8:2 (Spring 2018)
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2017
The James Blair Historical Review (Spring 2018) 
 
40 
about.”98 R.S. Taylor echoed, “Marster’s overseer was mean to us 
after marster died. Nothing we could do would suit him, and he 
whipped the Negroes.” 99  This unpredictable punishment was 
perhaps the hardest for slaves to bear psychologically. The 
capricious whipping of overseers offered slaves no refuge in good 
behavior. “The overseer on Master’s plantation was a mean old 
fellow, he carried his gun all the time and would ride a big fine 
horse and go from one bunch of slaves to the other,” explained 
Octavia George.100 Similarly, Wheeler Gresham mentioned, ““Ef 
a overseer got rough an’ wanted to beat a nigger, he had to go 
right den and dar. Dem overseer fellows wuz rough anyhow, dey 
warn’t our sort of folks.”101 Hal Huston described his mother 
being whipped for no reason by his overseer: 
 
“He never did whip me much ‘cause I was kind of a pet. I worked 
up to the Big House, but he sho’ did whip them others. Why, one 
day he was beating my mother, and I was too small to say 
anything, so my big brother heard her crying and came running, 
picked up a chunk and that overseer stopped a’beating her. The 
white boy was holding her on the ground and he was whipping 
her with a long leather whip. They said they couldn’t teach her 
no sense and she said ‘I don’t wanna learn no sense.’”102 
 
 Such unwarranted violence did not go unchallenged. 
Masters and mistresses alike resisted overseers’ efforts to assert 
control, usually in an effort to retain the benevolent, paternalistic 
image they aimed to project of themselves. They often stipulated 
that overseers could only issue punishments at their discretion and 
with their supervision, so as to maintain hierarchical control 
themselves. The most common form of resistance by masters and 
mistresses was firing the overseer for excessive violence. 
Sometimes overseers were even replaced by promoting a slave as 
the black overseer. Andy Marion recalled his mistress replacing 
his two white overseers with a black overseer: “Miss Mary run 
them both off and told marster what she couldn’t see to when he 
was away, she’d pick out one of de slaves to see after.” 103 
Similarly, Mrs. John Barclay recalled, “One time marster found 
out the over-seer was so mean to me, so he discharged him and 
released me from duty for awhile.” 104  Salomon Oliver boldly 
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declared, “If the slaves were not being treated right – out go the 
white overseer. Fired!” 105  “The overseer couldn’t whip the 
niggers, except in her [the Mistress] presence, so that she could 
see that it wasn’t brutal. She didn’t allow the women to be 
whipped at all. When an overseer got rough, she would fire him,” 
F.H. Brown additionally remarked.106  
 Alice Alexander recalled her master firing the overseer for 
his lack of control over the enslaved: “We had an overseer back 
on Colonel Threff’s plantation and my mother said he was the 
meanest man on earth. He’d jest go out in de fields and beat dem 
niggers, and my mother told me one day he come out in de field 
beating her sister and she jumped on him and nearly beat him half 
to death and old Master come up jest in time to see it all and fired 
dat overseer. Said he didn’t want no man working for him dat a 
woman could whip.”107  
 In one exceptional case, the mistress fired the overseer and 
appointed herself as interim overseer of the plantation. Valley 
Perry described her mistress, “Mis’ Lucy”, as an “angel.”108 Perry 
juxtaposed the character of Mis’ Lucy with that of her overseer 
who she stated, “wus kinder mean ter de slaves, an’ when he 
whupped dem dey ‘membered hit ter de longest day dey lived.”109 
She recalled that Mis’ Lucy would beg the overseer to temper his 
punishments against the slaves and often grab his arm and cry 
hysterically to get him to stop. Finally, Perry described, the 
overseer complained to the master, Mr. Nat, and threatened to quit 
if Mr. Nat “doan make Mis’ Lucy keep outen his business.”110 
The overseer and Mr. Nat agreed that each Tuesday Mr. Nat 
would take Mis’ Lucy off the plantation so he could whip the 
slaves without any disruptions. Perry detailed, however, that one 
Tuesday, Mr. Nat and Mis’ Lucy arrived home earlier than 
expected. “When dey drives up in de yard de oberseer am so busy 
whuppin’ de niggers what has done bad dat he ain’t seed Mis’ 
Lucy till she am right on him, den she snatch de heavy bullwhip 
an’ she strikes him two or three times right in de face… Dat 
settled de oberseer’s hash an’ atter he left Mis’ Lucy went ter 
doctorin’ cut up backs. Gran’mammy said dat dar wusn’t no more 
trouble wid de niggers an’ Mis’ Lucy done all of de punishin’ 
herself,” concluded Perry.111  
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Slave Resistance to Overseer Violence 
 
 Masters were not the only figures who contested overseers. 
Slaves also employed various forms of resistance against 
overseers’ attempts to assert control, in an effort to reclaim their 
own agency and dignity. One form of resistance slaves used was 
“conjure.” Mattie Logan recalled one “cure for mean overseers” 
on the nearby Lewis plantation: 
  
“Get a king snake and put the snake in the overseer’s cabin. Slip 
the snake in about, no, not about, but just exactly nine o’clock at 
night. Seems like the time was important, why so, I don’t 
remember now. That’s what the slaves did. Put in the snake and 
out went the overseer. Never no more did he whip the slaves on 
that plantation because he wasn’t working there no more! When 
he went, when he went, or how he went nobody knows, but they 
all say he went. That’s what counted – he was gone!”112 
 
 A second way slaves resisted their overseers was by 
cooperating with one another. If they could undermine new 
overseers’ efforts to assert control, they would never attain full 
authority over them. George Womble told his WPA interviewer: 
   
“The slaves knew that whenever Mr. Womble hired a new 
overseer he always told the prospect that if he couldn’t handle 
the slaves his services would not be needed. The cook had heard 
the master tell a prospective overseer this and so whenever a new 
one was hired the slaves were quick to see how far they could go 
with him. Mr. Womble says that an overseer had to be a very 
capable man in order to keep his job as overseer on the Womble 
plantation because if the slaves found out that he was afraid of 
fighting him (and they did sometimes) they took advantage of 
him so much so that the production dropped and the overseer 
either found himself trying to explain to his employer or else 
looking for another job. The master would never punish a slave 
for beating an overseer with his fists stated Mr. Womble.”113 
 
Womble’s recollection demonstrated that the enslaved actively 
challenged overseers’ efforts for psychological control. Much of 
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the success of the plantation depended on this race between the 
enslaved and the overseer to claim control, and Womble 
illustrated that the master harbored no qualms about releasing 
overseers if they failed to meet the burdens stipulated in their 
mutual agreement. 
 Another common form of resistance among slaves was 
running away. “De overseer give all de whippin’s,” described 
Fred Brown: 
 
“Sometimes when de nigger gits late, ‘stead of comin’ home and 
takin’ de whippin’ him goes to de caves of de river and stays and 
jus’ comes in night time for food. When dey do dat, de dawgs is 
put after dem and den it am de fight ‘tween de nigger and de 
dawg. Jus’ once a nigger kills de dawg with de knife, dat was 
close to freedom and it come ‘fore dey ketches him. When dey 
whips for runnin’ off, de nigger am tied down over a barrel and 
whipped ha’d, till dey draws blood, sometimes.”114  
 
However, the use of bloodhounds as previously detailed severely 
limited the chances of successful escape. Hence, slaves’ attempts 
to reclaim their agency by running away were rather limited. 
 Perhaps the least common form of resistance among 
slaves was violent resistance. Some slaves sought to reclaim their 
agency by countering the violence of the overseer with their own 
physical violence. Phillip Evans recounted an instance in which 
the overseer provoked tension with his Uncle Dennis. “Who was 
de overseers?” Evans repeated, “Mr. Wade Rawls was one and 
Mr. Osborne was another. There was another one but ‘spect I 
won’t name him, ‘cause him had some trouble wid my Uncle 
Dennis. ‘Pears like he insult my aunt and beat her. Uncle Dennis 
took it up, beat de overseer, and run off to de woods… After de 
‘vestigation they take him to de whippin’ post of de town, tie his 
foots, make him put his hands in de stocks, pulled off his shirt, 
pull down his britches and whip him terrible.” 115  Ida Henry 
recalled her overseer’s attempts to assert his own authority after 
her master left for war, stating, “As me Master went to de War de 
old overseer tried himself in meanness over de slaves as 
seemingly he tried to be important.”116 Henry related how the 
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slaves on her plantation actually killed their overseer for his 
attempts to assert psychological control:  
  
“One day de slaves caught him and one held him whilst another 
knocked him in de head and killed him…Before de slaves killed 
our overseer, he would work ‘em night and day. De slaves was 
punished when dey didn’t do as much work as de overseer 
wanted ‘em to do. He would lock ‘em in jail some nights without 
food and kept ‘em dere all night, and after whipping ‘em de next 
morning would only give ‘em bread and water to work on till 
noon. When a slave was hard to catch for punishment dey would 
make ‘em wear ball and chains. De ball was ‘bout de size of de 
head and made of lead.”117  
 
 Other examples exist of slaves engaging in violence 
against overseers. Martha Bradley detailed her violent resistance 
to the sexual advances of her overseer. She stated, “One day I wuz 
workin’ in de field and de overseer he come ‘round and say 
sumpin’ to me he had no bizness say. I took my hoe and knocked 
him plum down. I know I’se done sumpin’ bad so I run to de 
bushes. Marster Lucas come and got me and started whoopin’ me. 
I say to Marster Lucas whut dat overseer sez to me and Marster 
Lucas didn’ hit me no more. Marse Lucas wuz allus good to us 
and he wouldn’ let no body run over his niggers.”118 Anna Baker 
remembered a story of violence directed at an overseer: 
   
“I recolled a tale my mammy tol’ me ‘bout my gran’pa… 
Ever’thing was all right ‘till one o’ dem uppity overseers tried to 
act smart. He say he gwine a-beat him. My gran’pappy went 
home dat night an’ barred de door. When de overseer an’ some 
o’ his frien’s come after him, he say he ain’t gwine a-open dat 
door, Dey say if he don’t dey gwine a-break it in. He tell ‘em to 
go ‘head. Whilst dey was a-breakin’ in he filled a shovel full o’ 
red hot coals an’ when dey come in he th’owed it at ‘em. Den 
whilst dey was a-hollerin’ he run away. He ain’t never been seen 
again to dis good day.”119  
 
Lastly, Sallie Carder recalled her father’s attempt at disobedience 
to the overseer, stating, “De only trouble between whites and 
blacks on our plantation was when de overseer tied my mother to 
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whip her and my father untied her and de overseer shot and killed 
him.”120 Carder’s recollection illustrates that even despite the best 
efforts of slaves to resist the overseer’s assertions of physical, 
sexual, and psychological control, violent resistance had its limits. 
However, as demonstrated above, this featured as a common 
theme for all types of resistance. While slaves actively resisted 
overseers’ control to try and reclaim their agency and dignity, 
such resistance often proved futile and was almost always met 
with even greater violence from overseers.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This paper has painted a picture of plantation overseers as 
ruthless, power-hungry brutes. Yet, it deserves note that on rare 
occasions, slaves described having kind overseers. Isaac Stier 
confirmed, “‘Us had a overseer on de place, but warn’t mean lak 
I’se heard o’ other folks havin’. He was Mr. William Robinson. 
He was good to every’body, both white an’ cullud. Folks didn’ 
min’ workin’ for him, ‘cause he spoke kin’. But dey dassen’ sass 
‘im. He was poor. My pappy b’longed to his pa, Mr. John 
Robinson. Dat was a nice fam’ly wid sho’ ‘nough ‘ligion. Whilst 
dey warn’t rich, dey had learnin’.”121 Similarly, when asked by 
her interviewer, “Did the overseers whip you or were they good,” 
Rachel Sullivan replied, “Overseers wus good…Dere was 
Emmanuel and Mr. DeLoach. Dey couldn’t whup us or treat us 
mean.”122 Finally, ex-slave, Anthony Dawson, reported that his 
overseers served as conductors on the Underground Railroad:  
  
“Dis boy got out in de big road to walk in de soft sand, and long 
come a wagon wid a white overseer and five, six, niggers going 
somwhar. Dey stopped and told dat boy to git in and ride. Dat 
was de last anybody seen him. Dat overseer and another one was 
cotched after awhile, and showed up to be underground 
railroaders. Dey would take a bunch of niggers into town for 
some excuse, and on de way jest pick up a extra nigger and show 
him what to go to git on de ‘railroad system.’”123  
 
Yet even if some overseers proved kind, such behavior was 
usually at the behest of masters who frowned upon excessive 
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punishment. Moreover, the overwhelming amount of negative 
characterizations of overseers compared to positive ones indicates 
that thoughtful overseers were few and far between.   
 Ultimately, the presentation of overseers in the WPA 
Narratives dispels the idea that the “caricature” of the overseer is 
merely exaggeration, and instead demonstrates that overseers 
were hired largely to fit the stereotype of an “evil white man with 
a whip.” Overseers utilized both ritual and unpredictable 
punishments and behaviors to physically, psychologically, and 
sexually control the enslaved. Overseers bore responsibility for a 
range of various tasks and duties, and thus were able to exercise 
control in almost every aspect of the lives of the enslaved—from 
waking them up in the morning to concluding their work at the 
end of the day. Both white and black overseers alike turned to 
violence as a means of control. Overseers inflicted violence as an 
incentive for labor, a punishment for disobedience and running 
away, a means of sexual coercion, out of pure sadism, and 
sometimes for no reason at all. Such intense efforts for control led 
masters, mistresses, and slaves to all exercise their own forms of 
resistance. The most successful method employed by masters and 
mistresses was firing the overseer and replacing them with a less 
violent, sometimes enslaved, overseer. On the other hand, the 
enslaved resisted through conjure, cooperation among slaves, 
running away, and even violence—all in an effort to regain 
agency, dignity, and control. Thus, the sympathetic view of 
overseers shared by some modern scholars is unjustified, and the 
descriptions of overseers from the mouths of those they sought to 
control in the WPA Narratives suggests that this “caricature” of 
overseers was largely grounded in reality. 
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International Waters: 
Putting Hawaii Back in the American Civil War 
 
Rebecca Leidenheimer 
 
 
 
In February 1864, days before General William Tecumseh 
Sherman and his forces entered Jackson, Mississippi, U.S. 
President Abraham Lincoln took the time to write a letter to the 
newly-crowned king of Hawaii.1 Consoling the monarch on the 
death of his brother and predecessor, Lincoln wished him success 
in his reign. “Your Majesty may ever firmly rely upon my sincere 
sympathy and cordial support,” the President wrote, 
acknowledging that American feelings toward Hawaii were “of 
almost paternal regard, as well as of sincere friendship and 
unchanging interest.”2 Even as the Civil War raged, Lincoln and 
his cabinet understood the importance of maintaining American 
influence in the Pacific.  
Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Steven Hahn writes that 
“[telling] a familiar story in an unfamiliar way...challenges our 
understanding of the past and the future to which it gave rise.”3 
By centering the experience of Hawaii during the Civil War, this 
paper aims to illuminate the global implications of the conflict, 
tying together both Manifest Destiny in the Pacific and the “Age 
of Revolutions” rocking the Atlantic world. Hawaiian scholar 
Rhoda E. A. Hackler asserts that with the outbreak of the Civil 
War, American Secretary of State William Seward “presumably 
did not have time for the sort of problems which arose in far off 
Hawai’i.” 4  Yet Seward also signed Lincoln’s 1864 letter to 
Kamehameha V, revealing that both the Secretary of State and the 
President were tracking the Hawaiian situation and aware of the 
death of Kamehameha IV.  Historian Don H. Doyle argues that 
the American Civil War “must be understood within the context 
of alternating swells of revolutionary hope and reactionary 
oppression that radiated through the Atlantic world in the Age of 
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Revolution.”5  In Doyle’s 2015 The Cause of All Nations: An 
International History of the Civil War, the kingdom of Hawaii 
receives only a brief parenthetical mention despite its close ties to 
the U.S. and the broader world system. As Steven Hahn argues, 
“the Atlantic framework greatly underestimates the importance of 
the Pacific” in nineteenth century events. 6  Putting Hawaii, a 
Pacific island kingdom with a large American population, back in 
the Civil War connects these two narratives and draws attention 
to the ways that the Atlantic and Pacific worlds influenced each 
other. 
Scholars of the Civil War's effect on Hawaii have focused 
primarily on its economic impact, crediting the conflict with 
dealing a death blow to the New England-based American 
whaling industry, previously the islands' primary source of capital. 
In the years before the Civil War, whaling had been on the 
decline—the discovery of petroleum in 1859 made whale oil 
impractical and expensive, and overfishing led to scarcity.7 Then 
came the war, and with the combination of Confederate piracy 
(destroying over $1 million in ships and $500,000 in whale oil) 
and the sinking of whalers by the Union Navy to blockade the 
port of Charleston, the industry was brought to its knees.8  
  As whaling died, sugar cultivation became increasingly 
profitable in Hawaii. American demand for Hawaiian sugar rose 
since the Union was cut off from the supply of Louisiana’s 
plantations.  During the Civil War, the number of Hawaiian sugar 
plantations increased almost threefold, and from 1860 to 1866 
sugar exports went from less than a million and a half pounds per 
year to over seventeen million pounds per year.9 Significantly, 
most of the sugar planters in Hawaii were Americans of New 
England origin. Forty years after the war, this disparity was even 
more pronounced; Americans “owned four acres of land for every 
one owned by a native.”10 The growing postbellum power of the 
American sugar barons proved overwhelming to the Hawaiian 
monarchy. By 1893, their influence enabled them to depose 
Queen Liliuokalani and form the Republic of Hawaii, which U.S. 
President William McKinley annexed in 1898. Historian Jeffrey 
Allen Smith notes the irony of the Civil War’s economic impact 
on the islands: “the war that strengthened the United States as a 
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country laid the foundation for the destruction of the kingdom of 
Hawaii.”11  
  While important, the transition from whales to sugar 
should not dominate discussion of Hawaii’s role in the Civil War. 
Hahn notes that “it is impossible to grasp the significance of many 
of the important events of the nineteenth century...without 
recognizing the Pacific as an American destiny, real and 
imagined.” 12  Lincoln and Seward harbored interest in 
maintaining American influence in Hawaii not only for the sake 
of the sugar trade, but also because of the kingdom’s location. By 
1853, “the importance of the islands to the United States had 
increased due to the U.S. presence on the Pacific Coast, the 
prospect of a new and more stable government in China, and the 
opening of Japan to commerce.”13 Although historians frequently 
limit their discussion of the Civil War to its domestic dimensions, 
the conflict occurred in a time of U.S. expansion and growing 
influence on the world stage. Both Lincoln and Seward 
understood that the Pacific links America was forging needed 
protection. 
As a monarchy, Hawaii had a stake in what Ramón 
Castilla, the president of Peru, called a “war of the crowns against 
the Liberty Caps,” in which European monarchs would try to 
reassert their global authority in the face of the demonstrated 
failure of America’s “republican experiment.” 14  The kings of 
Hawaii during the Civil War period (Kamehameha IV [reigned 
1856-1863] and Kamehameha V [reigned 1863-1872]) firmly 
sought to align themselves with the European “crowns” rather 
than the American “liberty caps,” who posed more of a threat to 
Hawaiian sovereignty.  While Hawaii officially declared 
neutrality in the U.S. Civil War, it is important to note that “as the 
old European regimes had an interest in the failure of America's 
experiment in democracy, so too did the King of Hawaii and the 
political elite who served him.”15  
Historians have debated why King Kamehameha IV 
waited until August 1861 to declare Hawaii’s neutrality—and it 
was not until September that the king bothered to officially 
publish his proclamation of neutrality in a newspaper.16 Scottish-
born Robert Crichton Wyllie, the kingdom’s foreign minister for 
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two decades, believed that the Confederacy would eventually win 
independence. 17  Yet recognizing the Confederacy would be 
dangerous given the overwhelmingly pro-Union American 
presence in the islands.18 Thus, Wyllie instead advocated for a 
closer alliance with Great Britain to counter the strength of 
American influence. Wyllie worked tirelessly to garner respect 
for Hawaii on the international stage. The Hawaiian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was a busy place despite its size: a Russian visitor 
in 1860 described how "all the walls of the single room housing 
the ministry were lined with books, and there were piles of papers 
in the corners and on the tables...piles of papers were lying on the 
floor. Wyllie presided amidst all this in his dress uniform..."19 Led 
by Wyllie, Hawaii actively cultivated international ties, 
determined not to be subsumed by American interests. 
One of the ways in which Hawaii tried drawing itself 
closer to the English monarchy, in particular, was through 
religion. American missionaries had been a constant presence in 
the islands since the 1820s, and wielded significant social 
influence. Hawaiian nobility, including future kings and queens, 
received education at American missionary schools—accounting 
perhaps for the “paternal regard” referred to by Lincoln in his 
1864 letter. The well-traveled anglophile Kamehameha IV, 
however, thought Episcopalianism was “more compatible with 
monarchical government” than the American missionaries’ 
Congregationalism. 20  His brother Lot, later Kamehameha V, 
recalled in 1870 that “we thought, get England to be interested in 
us by means of her Church….and she will begin to learn more of 
us and take more interest in us which well fostered will ripen into 
a great friendship,” a counterweight to Lincoln’s reminder of 
Americans’ “sincere friendship and unchanging interest.”21 The 
Hawaiian royal family also developed a close relationship with 
Great Britain’s Queen Victoria. Indeed, she was the godmother of 
the tragically short-lived Crown Prince of Hawaii (who died in 
August 1862 at the age of four) as well as a personal 
correspondent of Kamehameha IV’s wife, Queen Emma.22 
American racial ideology and the perceived greater 
tolerance across the Atlantic contributed to the Hawaiian 
monarchy’s desire to align itself with Great Britain. As a young 
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prince in 1850, Kamehameha IV had traveled to the United States 
and found himself subject to American racial prejudices. While 
boarding a train in Washington, D.C., he was told to move by a 
conductor who did not know his royal status and assumed he was 
African-American and therefore in the “wrong,” white passengers 
only, carriage. The prince wrote in his journal that this was “the 
first time that I ever received such treatment, not in England or 
France, or anywhere else. But in this country I must be treated 
like a dog to go & come at an Americans bidding.”23 Americans 
in Hawaii shared American racist beliefs: Alexander J. Cartwright, 
a prominent leader of the Union cause and the chairman of the 
American Patriotic Fund in Honolulu, 24  “spoke publicly and 
habitually of ‘damned black kanakas [Native Hawaiians]’...by 
which he meant all Hawaiians from the royal family down.”25 
During the Civil War, Native Hawaiian soldiers who served the 
Union did so in segregated regiments.26 Such American attitudes 
stood in contrast to Kamehameha IV’s experience in England, 
which he found more free of racial prejudices.27  
As Kamehameha IV drew his monarchy closer to Great 
Britain, Lincoln and Seward took steps to maintain American 
influence in the islands. They recalled U.S. Commissioner to the 
Hawaiian Islands Thomas Dyer and replaced him with James 
McBride in March 1863. McBride’s position was elevated to 
Minister Resident of the United States,28 making him the highest-
ranking foreign official in the Islands.29 In 1861, the New York 
Times warned its readers that “the Powers of the Old World are 
flocking to the feast from which the scream of our eagle has 
hitherto scared them.” 30  No doubt by promoting McBride, 
Lincoln and Seward aimed to keep the American eagle screaming, 
a message to other foreign powers in Hawaii that America’s 
influence would not wane. 
The American Civil War served as a warning to the 
Hawaiian nobility about how a nation could be torn asunder from 
within.  In 1864 King Kamehameha V, an “uncompromising 
nativist,” decided it was time for a new constitution, thanks in part 
to the bloody events in America.31 Like many European monarchs 
in the wake of the Civil War, Kamehameha V saw American-style 
democracy as dangerous and in need of curtailment. Manley 
55
Mills: The James Blair Historical Review, Volume 8:2 (Spring 2018)
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2017
The James Blair Historical Review (Spring 2018) 
 
56 
Hopkins, British consul general in Hawaii, wrote that the purpose 
of the new 1864 constitution was “to destroy the radical element 
in the [previous] constitution, to base electoral privilege on a 
property qualification, and to give a larger place in the State to the 
king, allowing him to govern as well as reign.”32  
At the constitutional convention, chief David Kalakaua, 
who would become king ten years later, listened as another 
delegate gave an impassioned defense of American-style 
universal suffrage. To make his point, the delegate argued that 
widespread poverty in Great Britain could be blamed on that 
country’s limited voting rights. Kalakaua responded that while 
the man had mentioned Britain’s misery, he “forgot to say 
anything of the state of things in America, where universal 
suffrage did exist, and which was one cause of the present war.”33  
In an effort to strike a blow at American influence in the islands, 
the new constitution contained a stern reminder that “The King 
conducts his government for the common good; and not for the 
profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class 
of men among His subjects.”34 In the previous 1852 constitution, 
which had been heavily influenced by American missionaries, 
this article contained an additional clause which read: “Therefore 
in making laws for the nation, regard shall be had to the protection, 
interest and welfare not only the King, the Chiefs, and rulers, but 
of all people alike.” 35  By removing this final clause, 
Kamehameha V and his government reasserted the supremacy of 
the monarch and subtly turned the article into a rebuke of 
American influence. 
An intriguing footnote to Hawaii’s involvement in the 
Civil War is the postbellum activity of Samuel Chapman 
Armstrong, one of the few Hawaiian-born sons of American 
missionaries who fought in the conflict. (Scholars have noted that 
most Hawaiians who entered the war were kanakas,36 including a 
few pressed into service on Confederate raiders.37) During the war, 
Armstrong commanded an all-black regiment in the Union Army. 
In 1868, he founded the Hampton Institute (later Hampton 
University) in Virginia, designed to teach newly-freed African-
Americans technical and agricultural skills in a Christian setting. 
Armstrong said “it meant something...perhaps to the ex-slaves of 
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America, that...there was worked out in the Hawaiian Islands the 
problem of the emancipation, enfranchisement, and Christian 
civilization of a dark-skinned Polynesian people in many respects 
like the negro race.”38 Hampton alumnus Booker T. Washington 
wrote that “many of the ideas and much of the inspiration 
[Armstrong] used to such good effect in this country, he got in 
Hawaii.”39  
Hawaiian historian John P. Rosa insists that “the Pacific 
World was firmly linked by traders, merchants, missionaries, 
whalers, planters, and laborers to the Atlantic World and the rest 
of the globe by the end of the nineteenth century.”40 I would go 
further to argue that these links were evident by the American 
Civil War. To Lincoln’s government, Hawaii represented a 
gateway to Asia as well as a supplier of valuable goods such as 
sugar, wool, and meat to new states on the American west coast.41 
To the Hawaiian monarchy, the events of the American Civil War 
encouraged stronger ties with Great Britain to curb American 
influence and avoid the pitfalls of universal suffrage and 
republicanism. At the same time, the Civil War changed the 
foundation of Hawaii’s economy from whaling to sugar 
cultivation—a shift that would ultimately undermine the 
monarchy. Additionally, American conceptions of race and how 
they were refracted in the experience of Hawaiians helped shape 
not only Hawaiian reactions to the Civil War, but even U.S. 
Reconstruction via Armstrong’s Hampton Institute. By focusing 
the spotlight on Hawaii’s role in the Civil War, we illuminate 
profound connections between the nineteenth-century Pacific and 
Atlantic and expand our notions of the Civil War’s international 
impact. 
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Foes, Friends, and Fighting for Freedom: The 
United States, Soviet Union, and Cuba in the 
Southern African Regional Conflict, 1975-1988 
 
Erik Roberts 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The regional conflict in southern Africa reflected a 
conglomeration of domestic issues and international tensions in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Domestically, Marxist and conservative 
factions in Angola waged civil war in the aftermath of 
decolonization. Tensions between black South Africans and the 
minority government grew violent in the mid-1970s. 
Internationally, South Africa sought to impose dominance over 
Namibia, Angola, and other countries to thwart threats to its 
apartheid government. To establish its role as the regional 
hegemon, South Africa occupied Namibia in 1915. Nationalistic 
sentiments in Namibia rose in the 1960s, making the occupation 
increasingly contentious. Out of fear that a government 
unfriendly to South Africa could take root in Angola, the South 
African Defense Forces (SADF) invaded Angola in 1975. The 
regional conflict in southern Africa consisted of these domestic 
and international dynamics.  
 The United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba added 
another layer to the international nature of this conflict, as this 
area developed into an ideological battleground. Eager to gain 
influence in southern Africa, the Soviet Union supported the 
Marxist faction in Angola and opposed South African 
adventurism. The United States, keen to stymie Soviet influence, 
ardently supported South Africa and the conservative National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Cuba, too, 
entered the conflict to protect the newly decolonized Angola from 
foreign encroachment and support Namibian independence. The 
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conflicts in Angola and Namibia were initially predicated on 
independence and self-determination for Angola and Namibia. 
However, the region quickly became another opportunity for the 
Cold War superpowers to promote their respective systems. 
 The regional conflict was illustrative of Cold War 
pressures as a whole. Heightening and lessening of tensions 
between the superpowers reverberated in southern Africa. During 
the 1970s and early 1980s, the superpowers were very 
antagonistic, so they supplied their clients in southern Africa with 
tangible support—arms, military strategy, and trade. Though the 
regional conflict proved comparatively less violent in the late 
1970s and early 1980s than in 1975-1976 or 1986-1988, tensions 
remained high. Then, when the superpowers became more 
agreeable during the late 1980s, especially regarding intervention 
in the Third World, enhanced relations helped bring an end to this 
regional conflict. In addition, Cuba’s unflinching commitment 
and military might in the region established Cuba as the leader of 
the negotiations that ended the conflict. Its strength in the region 
facilitated the end of the conflict by cultivating changes in the 
U.S.-Soviet relationship. The newfound relationship of trust 
between the superpowers would allow the United States to be an 
effective mediator in the negotiations that brought about the end 
of the conflict in southern Africa.  
 
Part One. Doused with Kerosene: The Inception of the 
Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and Superpower 
Involvement 
 
Initial Engagement 
 
 1975 marked a critical year in the decolonization of 
southern Africa. After nearly a decade and a half of fighting 
between the Portuguese colonizers and The Republic of Angola, 
the fall of the Portuguese Estado Novo regime led to the country’s 
withdrawal from southern Africa. In Angola, independence was 
not solely an occasion for celebration; though free from colonial 
rule, Angola suffered from internal strife as three factions divided 
the country. Coupled with the rise of Namibian nationalism after 
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half a century of South African occupation, this development 
made southern Africa a region rife with internal tensions.1 
 However, the rise of nationalism in southern Africa was 
influenced by global movements. The People’s Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) represented the Marxist faction 
that vied for power in Angola after Portugal’s withdrawal. 
Heavily influenced by the Soviet Union, Agostinho Neto—
former member of the Portuguese Communist Party and leader of 
the MPLA—sought Soviet support in the struggle for control of 
Angola against the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola 
(FLNA). Eager to strengthen an already strong Marxist faction in 
a region with many burgeoning Marxist parties hoping for 
international aid, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev 
offered support to the MPLA. It seemed geopolitically prudent to 
Brezhnev to establish a stronghold in the region. Neto and his 
successor, José Eduardo dos Santos, found a partner in the Soviets 
from the onset of the Angolan Civil War.2    
 The United States involved itself in the early conflict in 
southern Africa as well. In fact, both the U.S. and the USSR 
proved active participants in the events in Angola even before 
South Africa, the regional hegemon, invaded Angola. The Ford 
administration had authorized covert arms shipments to the 
FLNA as early as January 1975 out of fear that the Soviet Union 
would escalate its commitment to the MPLA. Ford worried that if 
the Soviet Union gained influence in Angola, it could spread 
Marxism-Leninism to numerous other newly decolonized 
countries in Africa. Even before the first shots were fired, this 
conflict was steeped in Cold War tensions.3 
As the power of the MPLA rose in Angola, the United 
States and South Africa grew increasingly fearful of the potent 
Marxist doctrine in Africa. The South African government in 
Pretoria “feared that the USSR had a grand design to bring all 
southern Africa within its sphere of influence.”4 At the behest of 
the CIA and Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State for U.S. 
President Gerald Ford, South Africa intervened in Angola on 
October 14, 1975, aiming to topple the MPLA regime. The 
invasion failed miserably—Angolan and Cuban forces quickly 
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repelled South Africa. The conflict became truly regional with 
South Africa’s attack on Angola, as this was the first armed clash 
since Portugal left Angola. In a memorandum to President Ford 
in late December 1975, National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft held out hope that the Soviets would show restraint in 
southern Africa, but nonetheless acknowledged that Moscow was 
“willing to go a significant distance to support an MPLA victory” 
to cement a Marxist influence in the region. 5 As détente failed in 
the mid and late 1970s, America increasingly sought to thwart the 
spread of Marxism. The United States prepared to increase its 
involvement in this conflict, and the USSR did the same.6 
Though the level of commitment from America and the 
Soviet Union increased, the most direct involvement came from 
Cuba. Starting in 1965, Cuba sent material aid, military strategists, 
and even troops to Angola, among other newly decolonized 
African nations. Its intention was purely ideological; Castro 
genuinely cared about “aiding [Angola, Mozambique, and others] 
in their struggle for independence.”7 He sent thousands of troops 
to stymie the South African invasion in 1976. Cuba would remain 
in southern Africa throughout the conflict to protect Angola and 
Namibia and try to counter South Africa’s influence. In terms of 
manpower, materiel, and ideology, Cuba became the most 
committed foreign power in the regional conflict.8 
 
Quiet Phase 
 
After the initial South African invasion of Angola, 
domestic conflicts increased in importance. Inter-factional 
violence proved quite prevalent in Angola and Namibia between 
1976-1985. Even though much of the violence during this period 
appeared domestic, the interconnectedness of the future of 
Angola’s leadership and South Africa’s continued occupation of 
Namibia transformed these domestic clashes into regional ones. 
As these conflicts persisted and intensified in this span, both the 
Soviet Union and United States held an “almost apocalyptic fear 
of the consequences if the opponent won.”9 Each feared a shift in 
the global balance of power if their adversary gained influence in 
the region. President Jimmy Carter’s desire to let the southern 
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African nations “solve their problems without outside 
interference” reflected a mere platitude as America continued 
covert assistance to the FLNA and then to UNITA when the 
factions merged. 10  The Soviets became the preferred arms 
supplier for SWAPO, the dominant paramilitary group in 
Namibia, and the Cubans sent military training instructors and 
troops to assist the MPLA in Angola. Just as the United States felt 
the need to respond to Soviet commitment, the Soviet Union acted 
reflexively to American overtures. A victory for UNITA and 
South Africa represented an achievement for capitalism and the 
West. The opposite was true for an MPLA win. When the 
Americans committed resources, the Soviets felt they needed to 
respond with increased commitment of their own. Soviet Deputy 
Foreign Minister L.F. Illichev charged that the “rising threat of 
neocolonialist…maneuvers by Western powers” in Tanzania, 
Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola prompted the Soviet Union to 
redouble its commitment in arms to the MPLA and others. 11 
Mutual distrust caused both superpowers to increase involvement 
in the far south of Africa.12  
This fear proved emblematic of the superpowers’ Third 
World dynamic. Both countries were bent towards the goal of 
modernizing world order with their system of governance and 
economics—though they of course diverged on which system 
could bring about a prosperous modernity. Moreover, they each 
sought to prevent their adversary from spreading what each 
country viewed as a fundamentally destructive system. In the case 
of southern Africa, the desire to spread ideology and prevent the 
enemy from doing the same caused both nations to deepen their 
involvement.  
Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 further strained the 
tense U.S.-Soviet relationship. An ardent anti-Communist since 
his days as president of the Screen Actors Guild, Reagan brought 
blustering rhetoric and deep cynicism towards the Soviet Union 
to the White House. He was much more eager to engage in 
regional conflict than Carter; the Carter administration often 
begrudgingly undertook its commitment to southern Africa. 
Given the escalation of Soviet commitment and the growing 
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Cuban military presence, the adversarial East vs. West dynamic 
forced Carter to respond.  
Regan, unlike Carter, actively engaged and supported 
South Africa as a means of opposing Communism. The apartheid 
government in Pretoria abhorred communism because it had been 
attracting wide appeal among black South Africans since 1921. 
Empowering the black majority with a legitimate political 
structure and purpose posed a grave threat to the existence of 
apartheid. The minority government required obeisance from the 
majority to survive. Thus, Pretoria repeatedly rooted out 
communism within its borders and zealously opposed Marxist 
encroachment in neighboring countries. Despite its racial politics, 
Reagan readily supported the staunchly anti-communist, white 
government in Pretoria to diminish Soviet influence in a region of 
newly independent countries.13  
Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker was the 
primary formulator of U.S. policy towards southern Africa within 
the Reagan administration. A Georgetown professor of Foreign 
Service, Crocker brought a scholarly background, pragmatism, 
and years of experience analyzing American foreign policy to 
bear on the region. His preferred policy formulations, 
constructive engagement and linkage, facilitated a more active 
foreign policy stance. Constructive engagement sought to engage 
with the minority government in South Africa to foster productive 
business and governmental relationships with the goal of 
strengthening the capitalist beacon of southern Africa. Crocker 
hoped that engaging with Pretoria in this way would create 
positive relationships that would position America to push South 
African Prime Minister P.W. Botha’s government to undergo 
reforms and end apartheid.14  
Linkage, on the other hand, pertained to South Africa’s 
occupation of Namibia, one of the key contentious dynamics that 
sustained the regional conflict. Having conquered Namibia from 
Germany in 1915, South Africa subjected Namibia to apartheid 
and tied the country’s economy to South Africa’s. Pretoria 
established “a militarized police” under “an unelected 
administrator” to control Namibia. As Namibian nationalism 
grew in strength in the 1960s and 1970s, the United Nations, 
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SWAPO, and other organizations challenged South Africa’s 
occupation. International pressure continued to grow in the 1970s. 
As it did, South Africa’s hold on Namibia became increasingly 
tenuous.15  
The doctrine of linkage accepted that the 1978 UN 
Resolution 435 for Namibian independence served as the most 
realistic, unbiased option to deal with Namibia. Knowing that 
international pressure to support the resolution was increasing, 
Crocker tied the support of Namibia’s freedom to that of Angola; 
he would advise South Africa to withdraw its colonial regime 
from Namibia on the condition that Cuban troops left Angola. 
Crocker wanted to promote majority rule in Namibia and to 
“[counter] Soviet-Cuban adventurism.”16 Crocker endeavored to 
further American interests by helping South Africa emerge from 
the regional isolation it had experienced on account of Namibian 
occupation and the failed invasion of Angola in 1975. Overseeing 
the execution of Resolution 435 while removing Cuban troops 
from Angola would reduce the threat of a communist takeover in 
southern Africa.17  
Crocker’s implementation of constructive engagement 
and linkage became a discreet affair. In a coordinated effort 
between Crocker, CIA Director Bill Casey, Secretaries of State 
Alexander Haig and George Shultz, and National Security 
Advisor William Clark, the execution of diplomacy with South 
Africa was “purposefully kept out of the public gaze.”18 As South 
Africa became increasingly reviled in the United States Congress, 
the Reagan administration attempted to engage without drawing 
attention to the relationship. Crocker rightly feared that his ability 
to execute diplomacy in southern Africa would be jeopardized if 
the public knew the extent to which he hoped to interact with the 
apartheid government. The executive branch’s engagement 
successfully flew under the radar since the fighting in the region 
receded in the early 1980s, so southern Africa had faded from the 
public interest.  
For Reagan’s first term, constructive engagement and 
linkage continued without a significant challenge. Despite hopes 
for increased U.S.-Soviet trade during Reagan’s first term, 
mistrust and tension between the two superpowers remained high. 
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Southern Africa reflected this tension; as the superpowers’ 
relationship deteriorated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
impasse among South Africa, Namibia, the Angolan factions, and 
Cuba deepened. Nearly a decade of rising tensions made the 
region susceptible to hot war at any moment.19 
 
Part Two. Set Aflame: Tensions, Bullets, and the Settlement of 
the Regional Conflict in Southern Africa, 1985-1988 
 
A Shift in Perception of South Africa 
 
 Mark Mathabane grew up in Alexandra, one of apartheid 
South Africa’s most notorious townships. His youth was 
characterized by feeling “abandoned and betrayed by a world 
that…seemed to hold out nothing to [him] but hunger, pain, 
violence and death.”20 Growing up, he lived in constant fear of 
police raids in the middle of the night in which enforcement 
officers would assiduously searched for his mother whose 
“pass”—her personal identification booklet—was incomplete. 
His mother often hid in a dresser or fled out of a window. If she 
were caught, the authorities would take Mark’s father to tribal 
lands in rural South Africa or Namibia to undertake months of 
hard labor to pay off her debt. This vicious cycle plagued 
townships. Arbitrary pass laws ruled the land for which 
compliance was necessary to get a job, but jobs remained 
unavailable to those without proper passes. This treatment drove 
Mark to leave South Africa, but many others in Mark’s position 
opted to join paramilitary groups to oppose the minority 
government. 21  
In 1984-1985, township residents revolted against the 
government in a series of uprisings in South Africa. People like 
Mark’s friends could no longer contain their frustration over the 
lack of opportunity and constant degradation that the apartheid 
system brought upon black people. Black South Africans 
violently rebelled against the white government’s pass laws and 
constant surveillance, just as they did in the 1976 Soweto 
Township Uprising. Prime Minister Botha issued a State of 
Emergency in 1985 in response to the rise of clashes between 
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township residents and enforcement officers. The South African 
government heavily deployed its police force and military to 
townships across the country, brutally suppressing the revolt and 
killing many of its citizens. The white government exerted control 
over its black citizenry, creating a public spectacle of violence. It 
reminded the world that the government in South Africa was a 
repressive, racist regime.22   
The Reagan administration responded minimally to the 
outbreak of violence in South Africa. Though Crocker, Shultz, 
and Reagan all knew of the ferocious suppression of the uprisings, 
they did not want to take harsh economic action for fear of 
causing negative externalities for black South Africans. In their 
view, sanctions would further alienate South Africa from the 
global trade market, which would most directly affect blacks. 
Constricting South Africa’s access to markets and to capital 
would result in fewer available jobs, and blacks would be the first 
to lose their incomes. Politically, they feared that reproaching 
Pretoria would squander their ability to engage constructively 
with the country’s leaders. Condemning Botha and cutting off 
political ties would effectively let Pretoria “off the hook” without 
giving the United States a chance to use diplomacy to influence 
South Africa’s policies. Secretary Shultz described this logic in 
1986 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman 
Richard Lugar saying, “The consequences of a lack of action are 
terrible to contemplate. So even though the probability [of 
pressuring the South African government to abandon apartheid] 
is low, it seems to me that we have to work with that 
probability.”23 This was consistent with Reagan’s Third World 
policy in which he, as Duke Professor Hal Brands said, favored 
the “ability to blunt Soviet geopolitical momentum” even if that 
meant partnering with human rights abusers.24 The administration 
sacrificed taking an immediate moral stand for a long-term 
strategy that required engagement.25 
The administration knew, however, that it needed to take 
at least some action to respond to the repression in South Africa. 
Reagan and his team attempted to denounce Pretoria while 
maintaining their relationship and avoiding damage to black 
South Africans.  Continuing quiet diplomacy would reinforce the 
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sentiment that the administration tacitly supported the apartheid 
government, so Reagan took measures to reassure Congress and 
the American public that it condemned apartheid. He recalled U.S. 
Ambassador Herman Nickel in June 1985 and issued Executive 
Order 12532, which applied light sanctions to Pretoria three 
months later. With these actions, the administration sought to 
preempt congressional action, which it assumed would have been 
more drastic than their light reprimand. Reagan, Crocker, and 
Shultz hoped that these concrete measures, along with a shift to 
clearer rhetoric outlining their intentions in South Africa, would 
mollify Congress and the American people.26 
Before the township uprisings, Congress did not impede 
the administration’s diplomatic mission. Congress’ overall 
foreign policy making power was in decline through much of 
Reagan’s presidency. This reflected a sharp break from the 
assertive character of Congress in the mid-1970s. An intellectual 
movement in Congress called “new internationalism” fought to 
build foreign policy making prowess in response to executive 
overreach towards the end of the Vietnam War. New 
internationalists “attempted to use congressional power to remake 
American foreign policy, abandoning… [the] military-centered 
anti-Communism of the Cold War era” in favor of “promoting 
human rights and democracy overseas.”27 Starting in the early 
1980s, the trend of the new internationalists seemed to falter as 
the administration took control of foreign policy. The July 1985 
repeal of the Clark Amendment, which allowed the executive to 
uninhibitedly provide extended aid to Jonas Savimbi and UNITA, 
seemed to corroborate the rollback of congressional foreign 
policy power which the new internationalists worked to build in 
the 1970s.28  
By the second half of 1985, however, Congress began to 
reclaim control of foreign policy. Influenced by interest groups as 
well as the American public, Congress responded severely to the 
crackdown. Senators condemned apartheid for “state supported 
mass executions” and enacting arcane security laws that were 
“not legal and they sure [were] not the way to promote security.”29 
Members of Congress often employed the rhetoric of human 
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rights, and they condemned engaging, however constructively, 
with a racist regime.30 
In October 1986, Congress revealed its unwillingness to 
let the administration continue its engagement with South Africa. 
It would no longer tolerate supporting a government that only a 
fraction of Americans agreed to support. Following the new 
internationalists’ lead, Congress banded together behind a 
stronger sanctions package called the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act. Congress intended to undermine the South 
African government and provide various forms of aid to victims 
of apartheid. Legislators defiantly passed the bill over a 
presidential veto on October 1986. This reflected a clear shift 
away from what Congress broadly considered a foreign policy 
failure in constructive engagement. Constructive engagement had 
not achieved any moderation of the South African government, 
and the regional conflict remained tense (and expensive); thus, 
Congress wanted to develop a new strategy. Its dramatic 
reclamation of foreign policy power was emblematic of a shift 
away from support for the South African regime and towards 
reconciliation in southern Africa.31 
Cuba’s southern African policy was further validated as 
South Africa descended into violence and repression. Cuba sent 
troops to Angola in response to the South African invasion in 
1975 that America privately supported. Fidel Castro possessed a 
fervent ideological drive to protect decolonized Angola from 
colonial aggression. Though the initial turnaround of South 
African forces in 1975-1976 was successful, Cuba maintained a 
presence in Angola because the South African government 
continued to occupy Namibia, repress its own black citizens, and 
provide aid to UNITA.32 
Cuba found its presence in Angola even more necessary 
as the township uprisings further proved the intransigence and 
harshness of P.W. Botha and his government. Pretoria’s 
intensification of its repressive practices proved it was 
unresponsive to the pressure that Reagan’s administration applied. 
South African conduct vindicated Cuba’s presence. Cuban forces 
could not leave Angola while Pretoria displayed aggression and 
Washington supplied aid to UNITA. Increased repression at home 
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coupled with two waves of South African attacks on Angola 
exemplified the rise in South Africa’s hostility. CIA Director 
Casey corroborated that South Africa’s behavior was unruly when 
he surmised that even pressure to curtail repression from the white 
business community within South Africa made “little perceptible 
effect on Botha.” 33  These actions led to what “Pretoria’s 
Republican supporters in the administration and on the Hill feared 
most:” Castro more than tripled his troop count in Angola to 
50,000 men.34 Adding legitimacy to the Cuban cause justified 
increased involvement in the region over the course of the 1980s. 
The Cubans’ impact on the conflict grew alongside their troop 
numbers. South Africa had reignited the flame in the region with 
increased violence.35 
 
A New Day in the Soviet Union 
 
 The trajectory of the Cold War was forever changed when 
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev took office as the general 
secretary of the Soviet Union in 1985. Though his first two years 
in office did not represent a stark departure from previous Soviet 
leaders, starting in 1987 Gorbachev took steps that fundamentally 
altered the superpower dynamic and Soviet commitment to Third 
World conflicts. Abiding by a framework of ‘new thinking’ in 
Soviet diplomacy, Gorbachev exhibited his ideological 
commitment to ending Soviet involvement in regional conflicts.  
 Vladislav Zubok, an influential historian of Soviet foreign 
policy, describes Gorbachev’s transformation from another 
conservative Soviet leader to a genuine reformer. Zubok claims 
that the combination of “the deterioration of the Soviet economy” 
and his “romantic notions of international affairs” pushed 
Gorbachev to institute new foreign policy conceptions. 36 
Specifically, Gorbachev genuinely wanted to engage with Reagan 
and forge a new relationship with the United States. He also 
wished to scale back Soviet commitment in the Third World and 
focus on domestic improvement. As the Soviet system 
deteriorated in the 1980s, Gorbachev came to appreciate that 
Third World involvement strained the already declining Soviet 
economy. Gorbachev represented a generational turnover in 
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Soviet leadership, as he was less scarred by the German invasion 
in World War II than his predecessors. He also proved adaptable 
to developments in geopolitics and intent on improving affairs. 
This leadership from the general secretary was critical to relaxing 
tensions in southern Africa.37 
  ‘New thinking’ had profound effects on U.S.-Soviet 
relations. Gorbachev gradually reformulated his views on foreign 
policy as his relationship with Reagan developed and the Soviet 
economy worsened. Through a growing relationship of trust 
fostered by personal interaction at their multiple summits, 
Gorbachev came to see the U.S. as a partner rather than a foe in 
the Third World. He realized that the United States did not have 
the sinister designs that made former Soviet leaders nervous. This 
helped facilitate Gorbachev’s changing perception of Soviet 
security. The Kremlin did not feel the same encirclement or threat 
from the United States that had previously sustained Cold War 
anxieties for decades. This propelled Gorbachev to seek ways to 
withdraw from regional military conflicts without damaging 
Soviet prestige. He believed that “progress on these issues would 
be of mutual benefit” to both the United States and the Soviet 
Union; the destructiveness of “zero-sum diplomacy was nearing 
its end.”38 Thus, Gorbachev believed that a partnership with the 
United States could actually improve the Soviet situation, rather 
than imperil it. This allowed for a changed dynamic between the 
U.S. and the USSR.39 
 For the Reagan administration to believe that the “evil 
empire” had actually changed, actions needed to corroborate 
words. A clear indication that the doctrine of ‘new thinking’ 
would have a profound effect came on December 8, 1987, when 
President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF treaty 
at the Washington Summit. This agreement eliminated an entire 
class of nuclear weapons from each country’s arsenal. The INF 
treaty benefitted Gorbachev by allowing him to begin cutting 
military expenditures, and both leaders enjoyed a further 
improved security environment. Having experienced a 
momentous success together, Gorbachev and Reagan found a 
more willing partner in their counterpart. 40 
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 The most significant sign of a changed Soviet approach to 
foreign affairs emerged when Gorbachev announced that the 
Soviet Union would withdraw from Afghanistan. In a memo to 
Secretary Shultz on March 20, 1987, Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs Michael Armacost reported that during a 
consultation on foreign diplomacy with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze, he categorically declared that the Soviets 
“should get their troops out of Afghanistan promptly if they are 
serious about promoting real change in East-West relations.”41 
Pursuant to Gorbachev’s drive to focus Soviet efforts inward and 
stop the financial bleeding of external conflicts, the general 
secretary announced in April 1988 that the Soviet Union would 
withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in an even faster manner 
than Shevardnadze described to Armacost.42 
Gorbachev’s interaction with Afghan President 
Mohammad Najibullah, the former leader of the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan, reinforced that a changed 
ideology, rather than just fiscal practicality, motivated this shift 
in policy regarding the Third World. In a July 1987 conversation 
between the two leaders, Gorbachev demonstrated a growing 
understanding and acceptance of pluralism and of the problems 
that had plagued socialist governments. At the highest levels of 
the PDPA, Najibullah admitted, “narrow-mindedness of views, a 
lack of initiative, a disinclination to free themselves of the 
burdens of past mistakes, and conservatism” hurt the Party’s goals 
in Afghanistan and the prospects of Soviet withdrawal.43 When 
Najibullah stated “national reconciliation required new 
approaches and an abandonment of stereotypes and methods 
which have outlived themselves,” he was clearly talking about 
socialism.44  Gorbachev was quick to agree. The leader of the 
socialist world was coming to terms with the notion that socialism 
had inherent flaws. As a result, Gorbachev increasingly focused 
his efforts inward on the Soviet Union to repair his faltering 
system, rather than remain involved in expensive Third World 
conflicts. As a result, Gorbachev announced on February 8, 1988 
that if the Soviets could strike a multilateral understanding of the 
terms for withdrawal, he would begin removing troops by May 8, 
1988. 
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In the interim between the announcement and intended 
start date, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Shultz, and National 
Security Advisor Colin Powell met. The tone of this meeting was 
very cordial. Unlike previous meetings such as the Geneva 
Conference in which Third World support proved to be a source 
of discord for the two countries, in this interaction the leaders 
spoke more as partners than as adversaries. In fact, Shevardnadze 
called this conversation “a meeting of the minds” on 
Afghanistan. 45  Gorbachev substantiated his commitment to 
withdrawing from Third World embroilments by announcing 
removal of Soviet troops from the most prominent Third World 
conflict. 46  
The superpowers started showing a willingness to arrive 
at agreements on Third World issues. Gorbachev sought to focus 
Soviet efforts inward rather than allocate resources he did not 
possess to Third World conflicts that were not his main concern. 
As the regional conflict in southern Africa grew increasingly 
tense in 1987 and 1988, this newfound cooperation proved useful 
as the Soviets decided not to interfere in the negotiating process. 
Moreover, the modulation of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the 
Third World allayed both countries’ fears that their adversary 
remained committed to spreading their system throughout the 
world. This led to a changed security environment that was 
conducive to resolving the conflict. But despite these momentous 
changes, another country possessed even greater leverage than the 
U.S. or the Soviet Union. 
 
The Cuban Factor 
 
 Cuba had been a mainstay in southern Africa throughout 
the regional conflict. As the only outside power to send troops to 
the region, Cuba established authority distinct from other external 
players. The Cubans successfully fended off the initial South 
African invasion in Angola between 1975 and 1976. They 
remained in the country and continued to protect the MPLA. To 
Cuba, America’s support for South Africa and UNITA 
endangered Angolan and Namibian freedom. Castro would not 
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remove his troops while these threats persisted. Thus, Cuba stood 
by its southern African allies for fourteen years.47 
Cuba remained in Angola as a defensive force and stood 
prepared to counterstrike at any moment. In the summer of 1987, 
South Africa invaded Angola to defend the faltering UNITA 
military. The South African military stepped up to battle 
FAPLA—the military wing of the MPLA—at the MPLA military 
base in Cuito Cuanavale. The SADF turned around FAPLA, 
which safeguarded Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. Savimbi and 
General Geldennhuys rejoiced in victory, thinking they had 
routed the Angolan forces and secured the base. However, their 
military intelligence was insufficient—the South Africans had 
been informed only by UNITA reports. In reality, the Cubans 
hurriedly moved to repel the South Africans from Cuito 
Cuanavale.48 
Cuba exhibited strength through military defense. U.S. 
intelligence analysts telegrammed to Secretary Shultz that Cuban 
forces were storming towards Cuito Cuanavale. The telegram 
noted that “the Cuban press has been careful to emphasize that 
Cuban troops [had] not been involved in combat.”49 Only after the 
SADF crossed the Namibian border and attacked Cuito 
Cuanavale would Cuba mobilize its forces in Angola to reverse 
an offensive. Far from blustering and bluffing as Crocker saw the 
Cuban leader, Castro had been slowly increasing his military 
presence to defend against this kind of unprovoked attack. By the 
time the South Africans invaded Angola again in 1987, Castro 
boasted 55,000 troops at his disposal and they handily repelled 
the attack.50 Cuba readily proved its military hegemony.  
Castro’s decision to send more Cuban troops and 
weaponry strained Cuban-Soviet relations. The Cubans had 
hoped that the Soviets would provide arms in the face of South 
African aggression. The decision to commit their forces to 
repelling the attack was an arduous one in which Castro and his 
generals had to determine whether the situation was dire enough 
to risk Cuban lives to save this town from South African invasion. 
An icy summit meeting between Castro and Gorbachev in 
Moscow resulted in Cuba accepting the fact that if they were to 
respond, they would be doing it alone. Castro remained undecided 
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about sending troops until he returned to Cuba and read General 
Arnaldo Ochoa’s sobering assessment that “if the morale and the 
fighting capacity of the units are not reestablished, a catastrophe 
is inevitable.” 51  Thus, the Cubans—without notifying the 
Soviets—struck back in Cuito Cuanavale and reversed South 
Africa’s advance. With this decision, Cuba established that it 
would act independently of the Soviet Union and take on a greater 
role in the southern Africa conflict.52 
The Reagan administration knew that the Cubans 
maintained a strong military presence in southern Africa, but it 
still underestimated the significance of Cuba’s presence in the 
region. Crocker acknowledged that the Cubans were a “force that 
you could say was in some way going to be able to challenge the 
South African conventional forces.” 53  However, the extent to 
which Castro and the Cubans would gain leverage in southern 
Africa proved beyond what Crocker had expected. Defying the 
Soviets and operating as an independent entity, Cuba asserted 
itself as the dominant foreign power. Cuba had gained leverage 
after Cuito Cuanavale displayed its military superiority. A cold 
silence ensued in the Cuban-Soviet relationship in which the 
Cubans asserted their leading role in southern Africa. After nearly 
two months of silence, the Soviets came to terms with the fact that 
southern Africa was now “a Cuban campaign, the Cubans alone 
would direct it, the Soviets would be informed, but they would 
not be consulted.”54 
Gorbachev, committed to ratcheting back the Soviet 
Union’s commitments in the Third World, accepted this reality. 
Cuba’s strength forced the Soviets to take a lesser role in the 
region, which Gorbachev could justify by focusing on Soviet 
domestic problems. The Soviets could quietly extricate 
themselves from this conflict without causing damage to the 
Soviet regime. When Cuba and the United States pressured South 
Africa to come to the negotiating table, the Soviets closely 
watched the proceedings even though they would not directly 
participate. Rather, the United States freely mediated the talks 
without Cold War impulses, and Cuba possessed the critical 
negotiating strength. 
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Negotiations: How the Conflict Ended 
 
South Africa’s status as a pariah state, Cuba’s military 
dominance, and the improvement to the U.S.-Soviet relationship 
in the Third World provided the necessary context for the 
negotiations that ended the regional conflict in southern Africa. 
South Africa’s failed invasions and increased repression at home 
weakened its credibility with the United States. Congress’ 
increasingly hardline stance on South Africa and Pretoria’s near 
universal condemnation left it without bargaining power at the 
negotiating table. Cuba’s reversal of South Africa’s advances 
established it (along with its MPLA partners) as the military 
hegemon. Cuba thus entered negotiations with strength and 
authority. The Soviet Union’s altered security environment 
allowed it to accept that Cuba would not act as a Soviet client. 
Moreover, having relaxed competition with the Soviet Union in 
the Third World, the United States could more effectively 
negotiate because it did not fear Soviet adventurism. April 14, 
1988 marked the beginning of an eight-month process of 
negotiations.  
By March 1988, the Reagan administration no longer 
overtly supported South Africa. While Congress had usurped 
much of the administration’s formal policymaking power, Reagan, 
Shultz, and Crocker still covertly engaged with South African 
leaders. Crocker met with South African Foreign Minister Pik 
Botha in March 1988 in Geneva. He hoped to “help Botha 
persuade his truculent leadership to come back into the 
[negotiating] process.” 55  However, this round of negotiations 
would prove different from previous talks between Angola, South 
Africa, and the other actors. In a letter from George Shultz to Pik 
Botha, Shultz “expressed dismay at the renewed internal 
repression, urging Botha to avoid a gratuitous confrontation with 
Western governments and public opinion.” 56   The secretary’s 
letter conveyed to Botha that the U.S. would not support Pretoria 
as it had in the past. In these negotiations, the United States truly 
mediated and did not overtly influence on South Africa’s behalf. 
The significant losses that South Africa suffered in the 
Battle of Cuito Cuanavale pushed some leaders of the ruling 
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National Party to seek withdrawal from Angola. Cuban military 
power induced South Africa to come to the negotiating table, 
which it did in London in May 1988. In London, though, the 
South African delegation, headed by senior Foreign Ministry 
Official Neil van Heerden, was “not yet ready to negotiate” in any 
real capacity. 57  Van Heerden hastily concocted a delegation 
which included General Geldenhuys, who just days before fought 
in Cuito Cuanavale. The interlocutors included Cuba, Angola, 
and South Africa, with Chester Crocker from the U.S. as mediator. 
The Soviets, conspicuously absent from the talks, played a 
decidedly inactive role throughout the negotiations. Though the 
London talks did not lead to significant progress, they did mark 
the beginning of the essential negotiation process. 58 
During the next two meetings at Brazzaville and Cairo, 
South Africa arrived at the negotiating table intending to recoup 
authority. It looked to assert strength by demanding that the 
linkage between the implementation of UN Resolution 435 and 
Cuban troop withdrawals be the basis for negotiation. But Cuba, 
armed with geostrategic superiority, did not immediately respond 
to South Africa’s bluster at Brazzaville. The Cuban delegation 
took time to formulate a strategy. When the parties met again in 
Cairo, Cuba entered with a clear goal—to pressure the South 
Africans to agree to a plan for Namibian independence and 
withdraw their troops from Angola and Namibia. Cuba would 
leave Angola once South Africa met both conditions. It reoriented 
the negotiations around this plan and hoped the possibility of 
further military advancement would cause Pretoria to concede. 
Though Castro and his team had been willing to negotiate with 
the South Africans in London and Brazzaville, in Cairo they 
desired to project strength. Castro called Pretoria’s bluff.59 
By the time the Cairo talks occurred, the Soviets and 
Americans clearly held the same goals. Both countries wanted 
South Africa and Cuba to withdraw their forces, for Angola to 
settle its internal struggle politically rather than militarily, and for 
Namibian independence to come to fruition in the coming months. 
This convergence of aims allowed the Soviet Union to feel 
comfortable taking a secondary role in the negotiations. Chester 
Crocker offered Soviet diplomats like Anatoly Adamashin and 
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Vladlen Vasev greater involvement in the negotiations, but they 
ultimately demurred, preferring “to distance themselves from 
whatever went wrong while keeping a close eye on the talks by 
talking with [the U.S.] and with their socialist allies.” 60  The 
Soviets did not need to prolong the conflict, for their original 
goals of countering American adventurism and establishing a 
Marxist stronghold (which Cuban involvement was facilitating) 
no longer reflected their primary concern.61 
The Cuban agenda mostly aligned with the American and 
Soviet one. All three countries desired an independent Namibia 
and withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola and Namibia. The 
only substantial divergence was that the Cubans would not 
withdraw before South Africa categorically accepted Resolution 
43. Thus, Cuba had reversed the American policy of linkage. 
Whereas the Americans initially pushed for Cuba to leave as a 
prerequisite for South Africa accepting Resolution 435, Cuba’s 
geopolitical advantage meant it had the leverage to reverse the 
parameters of the negotiation. It would certainly withdraw, in line 
with Cuba’s ultimate goal, but on its own terms.62 
 The South Africans then made a critical military mistake. 
On June 26, 1988, they again invaded Angola in a desperate effort 
to regain a strategic advantage in southern provinces of Angola. 
In doing so the SADF killed 10 Cuban troops. The Cubans 
responded tactfully and powerfully, forcing the SADF to retreat. 
At this point, the South African people had become disillusioned 
by repeated failed invasions. Rather than continuing to absorb 
military defeats, Pretoria shifted the battleground from Angolan 
soil to the South African press. P.W. Botha’s government 
designed a propaganda campaign to bolster anti-Cuban sentiment 
and maintain support for South Africa’s regional adventurism. 
However, disapproval of South Africa’s involvement in Angola 
grew, and pressure—both domestic and international—mounted 
for the government to reach an agreement. The failure of this 
military strike cemented Cuba’s military dominance and reflected 
a crucial turning point in the negotiations.63   
 Further meetings in New York and Cape Verde featured a 
changed South African delegation. Having realized the extent of 
their military inferiority after the June attack, the South Africans 
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adopted a more conciliatory tone in New York. They attempted 
to squeeze at least some concessions out of the Cuban delegation 
to placate hardliners in Pretoria. Yet, the Cubans remained 
confident in their superior position and forced the South Africans’ 
hands. Crocker, free from Cold War pressures to forestall the 
Soviet goals, skillfully mediated the negotiations. The talks in 
New York led to an informal ceasefire and, more importantly, the 
South Africa delegation “accepted the Cuban demands” in full.64  
Cuba—and therefore Angola and Namibia—had won the 
diplomatic struggle. The South African forces started 
withdrawing from Angola and Namibia in August 1988 and 
completed that process in November of the following year. 
Southern Africa remained mostly free from regional violence and 
international influence. In December 1988, the foreign ministers 
of Cuba, the MPLA government in Angola, and South Africa 
signed the Angola-Namibia Accords. This agreement formally 
ended foreign involvement in the two countries and put into 
motion the implementation of Resolution 435. The United States 
and the Soviet Union achieved their shared goals in the last round 
of negotiations. The conflict was over.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The domestic conflicts in southern Africa were never truly 
domestic. In the Cold War era, the bipolar world order dictated 
that the two superpowers competed in vulnerable areas. 
Ideological rigidity characterized the first decade of the conflict 
in southern Africa; both the Americans and the Soviets sought to 
counteract their foe from gaining influence in the region. The two 
sides distrusted each other and supported client governments 
accordingly.  
But after 1985, the outlook of the regional conflict 
changed. South Africa’s increased repression further isolated the 
country from the international community. Cuba repelled several 
South African invasions and bolstered its military hegemony. 
‘New thinking’ in the Soviet Union and an altered security 
perception towards the Third World eased the tensions between 
the U.S. and USSR in the latter half of the 1980s. This opened the 
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door for Cuba to emerge as the dominant power in the 
peacemaking process. The easing of tensions allowed Cuba to 
redefine the terms of negotiation without external interference 
and made the U.S. comfortable shepherding the negotiations 
towards peace as a less ideological mediator.  
Cuba’s commitment to Angola and Namibia, both in 
thought and in action, proved effective. Its decisions were central 
to the end of the conflict. Cuba usurped power from the Soviet 
Union, brought the South Africans to the table, and ultimately 
established the terms of the peace in southern Africa. In the 
negotiations, the United States acted freely as a mediator rather 
than a committed partner to South Africa as a result of the 
modulated superpower relationship. ‘New thinking’ and a fresh 
Soviet leadership provided the impetus to redefine the terms of 
that relationship. The regional conflict ended due to Cuban 
strength, American and Soviet cooperation, and South Africa’s 
repression and intransigence. 
 
 
Notes 
1 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the 
Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 209-210.  
2 Conversation between Soviet Diplomat Evgeny I. Afanasenko and MPLA 
President Agostinho Neto, July 4, 1975, Russian State Archive of Contemporary 
History (RGANI), Wilson Center Digital Archive, 
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112138; Westad, The Global Cold 
War, 214-215. 
3 Seymour M. Hersh, "Early Angola Aid by U.S. Reported," The New York 
Times, December 18, 1975, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8.pdf 
4 Susan Onslow and Christopher Saunders, “The Cold War and Southern Africa, 
1976-1990,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War v. III, ed. by Melvyn P. 
Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
225, 229. 
5 National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft to President Gerald Ford, 
December 28, 1975, The White House, CIA Reading Room, accessed April 4, 
2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-104-1-4-0.pdf 
6 Onslow and Saunders, “The Cold War and southern Africa, 1976-1990,” 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft to President Gerald Ford, December 
28, 1975. 
                                                     
81
Mills: The James Blair Historical Review, Volume 8:2 (Spring 2018)
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2017
The James Blair Historical Review (Spring 2018) 
 
82 
                                                                                                                       
7 Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet, My Life (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 314. 
8 Ibid., 314. 
9 Westad, The Global Cold War, 397. 
10 President Jimmy Carter to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, 
February 14, 1977, The White House, Wilson Center Digital Archive, accessed 
April 4, 2017, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111269 
11 Report on Soviet Delegation to Tanzania, Zambia Mozambique, and Angola, 
February 6, 1976, German Federal Archives, Wilson Center Digital Archive, 
accessed April 4, 2017, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121060 
12 Westad, The Global Cold War, 72; Onslow and Saunders, “The Cold War and 
southern Africa, 1976-1990,” 231. 
13 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 
106-108; CIA Working Group on Angola, April 2, 1976, CIA Reading Room, 
accessed April 4, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/LOC-
HAK-104-3-8-4.pdf; Gordon D. Aeschliman, Apartheid Tragedy in Black and 
White (Ventura: Regal Books, 1986), 117-24. 
14 Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 1992), 58-62. 
15 Keith Gottschalk, “Restructuring the Colonial State: Pretoria’s Strategy in 
Namibia,” Namibia in Perspective, eds. by Gerhard Tötemeyer et al. 
(Windhoek: Council of Churches in Namibia, 1987), 27-34. 
16 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 64. 
17 Ibid., 68. 
18 Donald R. Culverson, “The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the 
United States, 1969-1986,” Political Science Quarterly, 1996, 141. 
19 Ibid., 141; Alex Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South 
Africa, 1948-1994 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 126-128; Geoffrey 
P. Levin, “Before Soviet Jewry’s Happy Ending: The Cold War and America’s 
Long Debate Over Jackson-Vanik, 1976-1989,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Jewish Studies 33, no. 3 (Spring 2015), accessed April 11, 2017, 
DOI 10.1353/sho.2015.0023 
See also "U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1981-1991," U.S. Department of State, 
accessed April 5, 2017, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/u.s.-
soviet-relations 
20 Mark Mathabane, Kaffir Boy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 167. 
21 Ibid., 167. 
22 “Liberation Struggle in South Africa,” South Africa History Online, July 21, 
2015, accessed April 24, 2017, http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/state-
emergency-1985.  
23 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New 
York: Scribner, 1993), 1117. 
24 Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American 
Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2014), 113. 
 
82
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 8 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol8/iss2/1
“Foes, Friends, and Fighting for Freedom” 
 
83 
                                                                                                                       
25 Ibid., 1117; Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 291; U.S. Congress, 
Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Situation in South Africa: Hearing 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 99th Cong. 2nd sess., 1986, 88-89; 
Glenn Frankel, “Sanctions Stir Emotions in S. Africa,” The Washington Post, 
Sept 8, 1985, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/09/08/sanctions-stir-
emotions-in-s-africa/3a9c43a0-0125-4aa8-ad75-
2b7fc3485c83/?utm_term=.15b92bfc8529; for more on Reagan’s new rhetoric 
see “Transcript of Talk by Reagan on South Africa and Apartheid,” The New 
York Times, July 23, 1986, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/23/world/transcript-of-talk-by-reagan-on-
south-africa-and-apartheid.html?pagewanted=all 
26 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 273; George P. Shultz, Turmoil and 
Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner, 1993), 1117. 
27 Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 241. 
28 Ibid., 282-285. 
29 USNBCWSJ.082686.R06, NBC News/Wall Street Journal [producer], Cornell 
University (Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research), iPOLL 
[distributor], accessed April 26, 2017; Senator Levin, 100th Congress, 2nd 
session, Congressional Record, 13968, accessed through Proquest 
Congressional. 
30 Culverson, “The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United 
States, 1969-1986,” 140-150; Letter from Howard W. Pollack to President 
Reagan, “Open Letter to the President [Regarding U.S. Policy in Southern 
Africa with Respect to Support for "Anti-Communist" Movements],” Wilson 
Center Digital Archive; 1986 embargo poll in NBC News/Wall Street Journal, 
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, Aug, 1986 [survey question].  
31 Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, 282-285; Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations, Gallup/CCFR Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign 
Policy 1986, Oct, 1986 [survey question], USGALLUP.86CFRP.R35, Gallup 
Organization [producer]. Cornell University (Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research), iPOLL [distributor], accessed April 26, 2017. 
32 Castro and Ramonet, My Life, 313; Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom. 
33 CIA NSPG Regarding South Africa, September 6, 1985, CIA Reading Room, 
accessed April 6, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP88B00443R000200890002-4.pdf 
34 Castro and Ramonet, My Life, 313. 
35 Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994, 
173; J.E. Davies, Constructive Engagement? (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2007), 157. 
36 Vladislav Zubok A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from 
Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 
302. 
 
 
83
Mills: The James Blair Historical Review, Volume 8:2 (Spring 2018)
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2017
The James Blair Historical Review (Spring 2018) 
 
84 
                                                                                                                       
37 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 412-414. 
38 Martin McCauley, Gorbachev (London: Longman, 1998), 138 
39 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 321; Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? 129; 
Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 409, 417-462. 
40 Reagan, An American Life, 699; Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? 133. 
41 “Memo from Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost 
to Secretary of State George Shultz,” March 20, 1987, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1981-1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-1989, Office 
of the Historian, 96, accessed April 6, 2017, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v06/d2 
 
43 Conversation between PDPA Najibullah and General Secretary Gorbachev, 
July 20, 1987, Gorbachev Foundation Archives, Wilson Center Digital Archive, 
accessed April 6, 2017, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117237 
44 Ibid. 
45 “Memorandum of Conversation,” May 31, 1988, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1981-1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-1989, Office 
of the Historian, 873, accessed May 1, 2017, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v06/d139 
46 Svetlana Sevranskaya and Thomas Blanton, “Afghanistan and the Soviet 
Withdrawal 1989, 20 Years Later,” February 15, 2009, The National Security 
Archive, The National Security Archives Electronic Briefing Book no. 272, 
accessed May 1, 2017, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/;  
Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, 
and The Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 383.  
47 Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, and Pretoria, and 
the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2016), 180-183. 
48 Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 396-408. 
49 Confidential Telegram from USINT Havana to Secretary of State George 
Shultz, ‘Cuba Describes Geographic Position and Military Role of its Forces in 
Angola’, December 7, 1987, National Security Archive, Wilson Center Digital 
Archives, accessed April 6, 2017, 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118169 
50 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 368-370; Castro and Ramonet, My 
Life, 329. 
51 Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 406. 
52 Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 406-410. 
53 “Assistant Secretary Chester Arthur Crocker,” Charles Stuart Kennedy, The 
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History 
Project, June 5, 2006, 67, accessed April 6, 2017, 
http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Crocker,%20Chester%20Arthur.toc.pdf 
54 Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 420; Crocker Oral History, 178-179. 
55 Crocker Oral History, 150. 
56 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 379-381. 
84
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 8 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol8/iss2/1
“Foes, Friends, and Fighting for Freedom” 
 
85 
                                                                                                                       
57 Jannie Geldenhuys, A General’s Story (Jepperstown: Jonathan Ball 
Publishers, 1995), 240. 
58 Westad, The Global Cold War, 391; Onslow and Saunders, “The Cold War 
and Southern Africa, 1976-1990,” 240; Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 452. 
59 Geldenhuys, A General’s Story, 262; Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 460-467. 
60 Crocker Oral History, 177-178. 
61 “Memorandum of Conversation,” May 31, 1988, FRUS, 1981-1988, Volume 
VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-1989, Office of the Historian, 1093, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v06/d161 
For an indication that the two powers were starting to see eye to eye months 
before, see also “Record of a Conversation of M.S. Gorbachev with US 
Secretary of State G. Shultz,” February 22nd, 1988, Gorbachev Foundation 
Archives, Wilson Center Digital Archives, accessed April 7, 2017, 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117248 
62 Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 338. 
63 Ibid., 468-470. 
64 Ibid., 475. 
85
Mills: The James Blair Historical Review, Volume 8:2 (Spring 2018)
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2017
